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ABSTRACT
Wright, Caleb, MA, June 2018

Major
History

The Beautiful Game as a Soviet Game: Sportsmanship, Style, and Statecraft during the Golden
Age of Soviet Soccer
Chairperson: Robert H. Greene
At the end of World War Two, the Soviet Union occupied a new global position and
found itself in a Cold War with the West. Cold War conflict occurred in a variety of areas,
including military, political, and economic. Additionally, athletics became an arena of direct
competition between capitalist and communist nations. Victory in the Olympics, World Cup, and
other international tournaments became just as important as economic success or advancements
in military technology. In many sports, such as ice hockey, the Soviet Union achieved superiority
over the West, but regarding soccer, the nation’s most popular sport, the USSR struggled to
accomplish consistent success.
The first national team of the Soviet Union lost early in its first tournament, but then
brought in new players and coaches. The rebuilt roster won the next tournament and ushered in
the most successful years of Soviet soccer, also known as the Golden Age. The period lasted
from 1956 through 1966 and witnessed the only two international championships ever won by
the Soviet Union. Many of the greatest soccer players in Soviet soccer history played during this
era and propelled the national team to its greatest victories.
Despite the success on the field, questions and conflicts off the field continually
transformed the characteristics of Soviet soccer. How did an influx of non-Russian soccer stars
change the concept of masculinity in the Soviet Union? What types of behavior did Soviet
authorities consider inappropriate and how did they propose to remedy such conduct? How did
Soviet coaches integrate Soviet cultural values into their tactics and strategies while remaining
competitive with Western nations? In what ways did political and military conflict affect how
Soviet soccer was played and who they competed against? Overall, the Golden Age of Soviet
soccer was an era not only of athletic success, but also a period of transformation that mirrored
changes in Soviet society as a whole during the same years.
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Introduction
In Yuri Olesha’s 1927 novel Envy, a soccer match doubles as the site of competition
between contrasting ideologies.1 In front of 20,000 boisterous spectators, a Moscow-based soccer
team hosts an exhibition match against a visiting German team. Though many of the fans support
their local squad, others are excited to watch the star German striker Goetske. The crowd is
enthralled with his skill and foreign demeanor, but as soon as the Soviet team runs onto the pitch,
they switch their excitement back to their home team. Leading the Soviet squad is goalkeeper
Volodya Makarov. He is a “professional athlete,” who despite his talent, plays modestly and
“passionately desired victory for his team and worried about each of his players.”2 However, at
least one spectator continues to support Goetske and the German team. Nikolai Kavalerov is a
young man who has rejected the new communist system and its value of collectivism. Instead he
dreams of attaining his own individual glory. He places his allegiance behind Goetske, who has
achieved the individual recognition to which Kavalerov aspires. Furthermore, he wishes for
Goetske to score to humiliate Makarov, whom Kavalerov despises for thriving in the communist
system. Therefore, Goetske acts as the embodiment of Kavalerov on the soccer field. Thus, the
match is not only an athletic competition, but a competition between Western individualism and
Soviet collectivism.
From the opening moments of the match, the Germans, with the wind at their backs, are
continually on the offensive. Goetske’s reputation proves well-deserved, leading attack after
attack against the Soviet defense. However, Makarov is equal to the task, repeatedly saving

1

For the purposes of this paper, I use American vocabulary and refer to the sport as soccer instead of football
(except when used in a direct quote). However, in an effort to limit repetition, I use transatlantic vocabulary in
reference to different aspects of soccer. Therefore, games will also be called matches, coaches as managers, teams as
squads or clubs, fields as pitches, etc. Additionally, “the Beautiful Game” is a common nickname for soccer which
originated in the 1950s but was popularized by Pelé’s 1977 autobiography “My Life and the Beautiful Game.”
2
Yuri Olesha, Envy, trans. Marian Schwartz (New York: New York Review Books, 2004), 137.

Goetske’s shots and keeping the score level. After each acrobatic save, the crowd reacts with
louder and louder cheers. Just before halftime, Goetske finally beats Makarov and puts the
Germans ahead 1-0. Still, during halftime, fans swarm Makarov and lift him into the air,
celebrating his performance.
Olesha’s description of the soccer match, though fictional, displays an idealized version
of soccer in the Soviet Union. First, the hero of the match is not the goal-scorer Goetske, but the
masculine Soviet man of action, Makarov. He does not play passively as a goalkeeper (which by
nature is a largely reactionary position) but exerts control over the game and even over the laws
of nature as well. Makarov “would catch the ball in midflight, when it seemed mathematically
impossible… Volodya wasn’t catching the ball, he was ripping it from its line of flight, like
someone who has violated the laws of physics and was hit by stunning action of thwarted
forces.”3 Makarov’s physical style of play makes him a masculine figure; Olesha emphasizes
Makarov’s strength and physical features throughout the description of the match and halftime.
Goetske and Kavalerov, on the other hand, do not display the same physical presence or intrepid
attitude displayed by the Soviet goalkeeper. Despite his talent, physically, Goetske “turned out to
be a short, swarthy-faced, round-shouldered little man” and “looked like a gypsy.”4 Kavalerov
does not portray a masculine persona either, due to his inability to act decisively when the
moment demands it. During the first half, the ball is struck out of play and into the stands. It
ultimately stops at Kavalerov’s feet but “[he] was passive” and another spectator must grab the
ball at his feet and return it to the field.5 Kavalerov imagines the entire crowd laughing at his
inaction, which compounds his hatred for Makarov and the new Soviet society.

3

Ibid, 136.
Ibid, 134, 141.
5
Ibid, 140.
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Another defining Soviet characteristic of Makarov is his commitment to the collective.
Despite being the star of the team, Makarov values “the overall progress of the game, the overall
victory, the outcome” over his own performance.6 In contrast, Goetske “treasured only his own
success” and played “for himself, at his own risk, neither taking nor giving help.”7 The two
players are complete opposites: one defensive and one offensive, one modest and the other
arrogant. It is noteworthy that at halftime Makarov is congratulated while Goetske is ignored by
the fans.
Lastly, Olesha’s soccer match displays the value of soccer on the formation of national
identity. Soccer was the most popular sport in Europe; match results and stars players were
internationally known. For example, Goetske’s fame reached beyond the boundaries of Germany
to the Soviet Union and likely throughout the rest of Europe. Presumably, a Moscow victory
over the Germans would also create news not only in the Soviet Union, but in Germany as well
and perhaps Makarov’s heroic performance could earn him an international reputation like that
of Goetske. During the match, Makarov is aware of the international importance of the
competition and is eager to impress the foreign opposition. Olesha writes, “He was also
interested in what opinion the famous German was forming about the Soviet game… he felt like
shouting to Goetske then: ‘Look how we’re playing! Do you think we’re playing well?!’”8
Representing his nation well was important to Makarov; this is again contrasted with Goetske,
who “was not there to support his team’s honor” and despised even his own teammates.9
Curiously, Olesha never reveals the final outcome of the match. Kavalerov, the novel’s
narrator, leaves at halftime with the Soviets trailing 1-0. There are hints that the Muscovites will
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come back in the second half when the wind is at their back and Goetske tires.10 However,
regardless of the final result, the Soviets are already ideologically victorious. Makarov’s first half
performance proved the superiority of Soviet masculinity, collectiveness, and national pride over
its Western counterparts. The final score was merely a minor detail.
Nearly twenty years after the publication of Envy, a Moscow soccer teamed faced a
similar situation. In November 1945, Dinamo Moscow traveled the United Kingdom to play four
exhibition matches against four storied British clubs. The tour’s official purpose was to foster a
spirit of friendship and cooperation between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union. From
the British perspective, this tour was a distraction to the post-war economic depression and a
welcome return to international soccer. However, for the Soviets, the tour was much more than a
series of friendly matches. Soccer had been the most popular sport in the Soviet Union, both in
terms of participation and spectator attendance, during the interwar period. Yet, the Soviet Union
had not concerned itself with international competition, forgoing participation in the Olympic
games and the World Cup. Therefore, Soviet soccer garnered little respect from the rest of the
world. Success in Britain, the birthplace of soccer, would prove the competitiveness and skill of
Soviet soccer teams and their style of play. Moreover, victory for Dinamo would be more than
success on the soccer field; like Makarov’s success over Goetske and Kavalerov, a Soviet victory
would also be proof of the superiority of Soviet ideology.
Few, especially in Britain, expected Dinamo to achieve victory. Instead of playing an
untitled German team, Dinamo competed against historic clubs such as Chelsea and Arsenal.
Furthermore, in place of the fictional Goetske, the Soviet team faced the threat of real-life stars

10

Evidence suggests Olesha based his match on an actual game between a Moscow soccer club and a German
workers’ team, which the Soviets won 4-1. See Victor Peppard, “Olesha’s Envy and the Carnival,” in Russian
Literature and American Critics, ed. by Kenneth N. Brostrom (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1984), 183.
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Tommy Lawton and Stanly Matthews. Lastly, the Moscow squad would not be playing at home
in front of 20,000 spectators, but on foreign soil in front of over 100,000 fans. The British sport
press appreciated Dinamo’s play, but still expected a complete British victory. A London Times
report, while acknowledging Dinamo’s ball control and speed of play, doubted if they could
compete with British teams, writing “It remains to be seen how this [the British style of play]
will affect Moscow Dynamo’s play over here. Showy football and football under intense
pressure can be rather different things…”11 In other words, Dinamo’s style might succeed in the
Soviet Union, but the physicality and aggression of British teams was expected to overwhelm the
Soviets.
Amazingly, the tour was a massive success for the Soviets. Out of four games, Dinamo
won twice and tied the other two. Furthermore, Dinamo’s conduct and style of play reflected
Soviet values of collectivism displayed in Envy. While Soviet strikers like Vsevolod Bobrov and
Konstantin Beskov drew praise, it was Dinamo’s goalkeeper, Alexei Khomich, who became the
star. His reflexes and athleticism earned him the nickname “Tiger” from the English fans. Even
when Dinamo scored ten goals in a single match, a reporter for the London Times reported
“Khomich, who is surely one of the best of goalkeepers, stood head and shoulders above their
colleagues in the defence.”12 Still, as a squad, Dinamo also displayed an emphasis on collective
attitude and team play. In a victory over the London-based Arsenal Football Club, the London
Times noted “What was clear was the Russian superiority in collective ball-control… compared
with [Dinamo’s] team-work that of Arsenal was painfully ragged and uncertain.”13 Finally,

“Russians at Stamford Bridge.” London Times, 11.13.1945.
“Cardiff Outplayed by Dynamo” London Times 11.19.1945.
13
“Dynamo Beat Arsenal in the Fog” London Times, 11.22.1945.
11
12
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Dinamo’s success elevated the international perception of Soviet soccer. Even British clubs
began adopting Dinamo’s style of play and preparation after the tour.

Soviet Soccer History
Dinamo’s victories were such a surprise to Great Britain and the rest of Europe due to the
Soviet Union’s unremarkable soccer history. In the early 1860s, English and Scottish sailors
introduced soccer to Russia through port cities like Saint Petersburg and Odessa. Though soccer
immediately became popular with local Russian citizens, it was not until 1879 when the first allRussian match took place between two factory-organized teams in Saint Petersburg.14 By the
beginning of the 20th century, soccer had become popular enough to warrant the creation of a
city-wide tournaments. The Aspden Cup (a Saint Petersburg tournament) of 1908 signaled a
dramatic shift in Russia’s soccer landscape. The traditionally strong team Nevsky, operated by
and comprised of foreigners, lost the tournament final to Sport, an entirely Russian team. After
Sport’s victory in 1908, Russian teams not only gained confidence to play foreign teams within
Russia, but also began to invite professional teams from Europe. Yet, hopes for success in
international competition were quickly dashed. In 1910, European teams toured Russia in a
series of exhibition matches. Corinthians, a successful Prague-based club, played three matches,
outscoring their Russian opponents by twenty-one goals. Later that year, a team of English
professionals also played three exhibition matches. They won all three games by a combined
score of 31-0.15 However, the largest international soccer embarrassment occurred in 1912. The
Tsarist government intended the Stockholm Olympics to be a dramatic leap forward for Russian

14

Louise McReynolds, Russia at Play: Leisure Activities at the End of the Tsarist Era (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 2003), 102.
15
James Riordan. “Tsarist Russia and International Sport,” Stadion 14 (1988): 227.
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sports but resulted in what the Russian press labelled a “Sporting Tsushima,” in reference to
Russia’s military disaster in the Russo-Japanese war.16 The soccer team was the most
emblematic of the catastrophe. After losing their first game to Finland, Russia lost to
Germany16-0, a record goal differential in international competition at the time.17
By the time the Bolsheviks gained power, soccer had firmly rooted itself in Russian
culture; so much so, that the new regime needed to incorporate soccer into Marxist ideology and
the structure of the new government. In Moscow, Soviet authorities placed prerevolutionary
soccer clubs under the control of proletarian and state organizations.18 During the 1920s and
1930s, Soviet sport officials focused on improving soccer domestically and using sport to
strengthen Soviet culture. Soviet teams played dozens of foreign clubs, both hosting them in the
Soviet Union and traveling abroad. Most of these matches resulted in a Soviet win.19 The Soviet
state used these victories as examples of how amateurs from a socialist society were superior to
bourgeois athletes. Yet, while the Soviet Union considered their players amateurs, they were so
in name only. Players and coaches were officially members of a proletarian or government
organization but devoted their time exclusively to training. Therefore, it is no surprise that Soviet
“amateurs” defeated foreign teams that were truly comprised of non-professional players.
When soccer professionals did tour the Soviet Union, the result exposed the true level of
Soviet soccer. During the Spanish Civil War, a team of Basque all-stars touring Europe agreed to
play several matches in the Soviet Union in an effort to raise awareness of their struggle. The
Basque team defeated Dinamo Moscow 2-1, tied Dinamo Leningrad, and recorded easy victories
John D Windhausen, “National Identity and the Emergence of the Sports Movement in Late Imperial Russia,”
History of European Ideas Vol. 16, No. 4-6 (1993): 874.
17
James Riordan, “The Development of Football in Russia and the USSR: Part I,” New Zealand Slavonic Journal 10
(1972), 69.
18
Robert Edelman, Serious Fun: A History of Spectator Sports in the USSR (New York: Oxford University Press,
1993), 45. Also see James Riordan, Sport in Soviet Society (London: Cambridge University Press, 1977), 94.
19
Edelman, Serious Fun, 49-51.
16
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against Dinamo Kiev, Tbilisi, and Minsk. Spartak Moscow claimed the only Soviet victory, but
even that required questionable refereeing that favored the Soviet team.20 Not only were the
Basques superior in individual skill, but they exposed the outdated tactics, formations, and
training methods of Soviet teams. Even Pravda, the official newspaper of the Communist Party
acknowledged this gap in skill, stating “The performances of Basque Country in the USSR
showed that our best teams are far from high quality… Improving the quality of Soviet teams
depends directly on matches against serious opponents.”21
World War Two interrupted the progress of Soviet soccer, but the sport still proved
useful to Soviet society by providing a nation of physically fit men ready to become soldiers.
During the war, a Soviet commander wrote in a letter to the periodical Fizkul’tura i Sport, “We
owe it to the sports organizations that Soviet People were trained and had imparted to them such
qualities as courage, persistence, will power, endurance, and patriotism.”22 The war had proven
sports’ utility to the Soviet Union. Yet, it also destroyed the sporting infrastructure of the nation.
Soccer was the sport that revived most quickly, perhaps because of its prewar popularity or
because the simplicity of the game required little more than an open patch of field. The Soviet
Top League resumed play only weeks after Germany’s surrender. Fans overcrowded derelict
stadiums and teams scrambled to assemble full rosters, but overall, soccer offered a return to
normalcy for Soviet citizens.23
Therefore, the Dinamo tour of 1945 served as the catalyst for a new era of Soviet soccer.
The British were stunned that players from a devastated nation with little soccer history had
defeated the best teams from the country that invented the game of soccer. In the Soviet Union,

20

Edelman, Serious Fun, 63-64.
Jonathan Wilson, Inverting the Pyramid: The History of Soccer Tactics (New York, Nation Books, 2013), 79.
22
Riordan, Sport in Soviet Society, 154
23
Edelman, Serious Fun, 87.
21
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the tour’s success encouraged Soviet officials to continue competing internationally. Over the
next two decades, the Soviet Union experienced the most successful years in Soviet soccer
history, including two international championships and the prime playing years for many Soviet
soccer greats. In addition to winning, the Soviet Union strived to play in such a way that
reflected and promoted Soviet values of collectivism and sportsmanship to both domestic and
foreign audiences.
The Soviet state controlled nearly all aspects of soccer during Stalin’s last years. Soviet
soccer reflected the authoritative, top-down structure of the Soviet government, extending from
the Committee of Physical Culture and Sport through various subcommittees all the way to
coaches and players. Just as average Soviet citizens were to obey the laws and policies of the
Party, players and coaches also dutifully followed the rules imposed upon them. On the field,
players operated inside a regimented strategy. Even in systems that allowed players to
interchange positions, they did so as part of an organized formation; spontaneous,
improvisational skills or movement did not fit into the Soviet system of soccer. Furthermore,
soccer reflected the xenophobic nature of Stalinism by avoiding direct competition with capitalist
nations, which in turn caused an absence of influence from Western European tactics and
customs.
Yet, after Stalin’s death and Khrushchev’s assumption of power, the strict control of the
government on society and soccer loosened. Khrushchev implemented many economic, political,
and social reforms aimed at moving away from Stalinism. As before, Soviet soccer mirrored the
structure of Soviet government; Soviet players and coaches increasingly gained freedoms
regarding coaching and playing style. The Soviet Union proactively engaged with soccer teams
from around the world and Soviet coaches adapted elements from Western European and Latin

9

American soccer into the Soviet style. Players had opportunities to express their individuality
and began to resemble their capitalist counterparts. These new freedoms were limited, even in
terms of soccer, but were freedoms nonetheless.

Chapter Previews
This thesis explores the relationship between soccer and identity in the Soviet Union
during the 1950s and 1960s. These decades were years of dramatic transformations within the
Soviet Union, and soccer was not insulated from such changes. As the country struggled to move
away from Stalinist attitudes and policies, soccer, too, attempted to move on from practices
common during Stalin’s era. Additionally, in the 1950s, the USSR began competition in
international sports and was dominating sporting events by the 1960s, especially in the fields of
ice hockey and the Olympic games. Soccer, however, did not enjoy such immediate success.
This does not mean the decades were an embarrassment. In fact, the ‘50s and ‘60s were the most
successful years for the national team and the prime playing years for many Soviet soccer greats.
Therefore, soccer writers have labeled these years the “Golden Age of Soviet Soccer.” Yet, even
during its “golden age,” Soviet soccer often occupied a second-tier status in international soccer;
not a weak team, but not considered one of the world’s best.
The thesis will be divided into three chapters, each examining the relationship between
identity and a particular feature of Soviet soccer. The first chapter explores how Soviet soccer
players displayed Soviet values and Soviet masculinity. In Soviet culture, the concept of
masculinity constituted more than physical ability; it also included being cultured, modest, and
politically active. Therefore, Soviet players were first required to be proper Soviet citizens. This
meant Soviet players needed to display excellence and sportsmanship on the field, and
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refinement and class off the field. Such expectations also extended to soccer fans in the Soviet
Union. Just as the players were required to respect their opponents and the referee, spectators
were expected to do the same. Soviet officials determined that to achieve such behavior,
ideological-political education was more important than athletic training. However, this chapter
shows that as the USSR began competing internationally, Soviet players and fans witnessed
Western forms of sportsmanship, spectating, and even hooliganism, which began mixing with
and undermining preexisting Soviet values.
The second chapter examines how Soviet soccer players and coaches emphasized the
value of collectivism in their play. Dinamo’s 1945 tour set an example for future Soviet teams in
terms of both success and style. While the Soviet Union national soccer team, which was formed
in 1952, achieved only occasional success, it did replicate the collective style of play which came
to be the defining characteristic of Soviet soccer. The pinnacle of Soviet soccer success was a
gold medal at the 1956 Melbourne Olympics and winning the inaugural European Nations Cup
in 1960. Yet, even as the USSR reigned as champions of Europe, teams around the world
continued to change and advance their tactics and style; Soviet coaches had to modify their style
to keep up with the rest of the world. This chapter argues that Soviet coaches adapted Western
tactical innovations but kept the principle of collectivism at the center of the Soviet style of play.
These adaptations allowed the Soviet national team to remain competitive and successful
throughout the 1960s.
Lastly, the third chapter focuses on the role soccer played in Soviet foreign policy. The
Soviet Union national soccer team differed from other Soviet national teams in two important
ways. First, as the most popular sport in the Soviet Union, the team faced more pressure from the
Soviet public to be successful. Secondly, since soccer is the most popular sport globally, the
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national soccer team competed against a wider range of nations, which included nations in
political conflict with the Soviet Union. At times, this political tension spilled over into the
athletic arena through means such as boycotts or extra-physical play. This chapter focuses on the
soccer relationship between the Soviet Union and Hungary and how it reflected their changing
political relationship. In the early 1950s, the Hungarian national team was the best in the world;
the Soviet Union attributed their success to socialism, which produced naturally superior players.
However, after the Hungarian crisis of 1956, many of the national team’s best players, abroad at
the time of the revolt, refused to return. Many of those stars relocated to Spain, which irritated
both Hungarian and Soviet officials. The Hungarian team ultimately rebuilt itself, and by the
mid-1960s, the USSR, Spain, and Hungary were three of the top teams in the world. This chapter
argues that high-profile matches in the European Championships and the World Cup further
strained the political tensions that existed between these nations during the Cold War.

Historiography
This thesis engages with four distinct but connected historiographies. First, this thesis
deals with the historiography of masculinity and fame in the Soviet Union. In “Yuri Gagarin and
Celebrity Masculinity in Soviet Culture,” Erica L. Fraser argues that after the death of millions
of male soldiers in World War Two, the Soviet Union actively sought to “remasculinize” the
military and Soviet society. Cosmonauts involved in space exploration became the focus of
reestablishing masculinity, and Yuri Gagarin was the prime example. Gagarin’s masculinity was
not only defined by his bravery and heroism, but also by his charisma, political savvy, and
devotion to his family. Therefore, it was not action alone, but also personal intelligence and
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integrity, that defined masculinity in Soviet culture.24 This concept of masculinity extended
beyond cosmonauts to other forms of celebrity as well. Julie Gilmour and Barbara Evans
Clements have examined the presentation of Soviet athletes (fictional, male athletes used in
propaganda posters) and the Soviet concept of masculinity. They conclude that Soviet media
regularly featured physically fit males not only to inspire healthy living, but also the discipline
and hard work needed to achieve such a physique.25 Expanding on the presentation of Soviet
athletes, Evelyn Mertin has examined how sports heroes served as role models in the Soviet
Union. She argues that Soviet sports organizations not only expected Soviet athletes to inspire
through athletic achievements, but also through political engagement and moral behavior. Mertin
uses two case studies (runner Vladimir Kuts and gymnast Ludmilla Tourishcheva) to illustrate
how Soviet publications presented athletes as ordinary people who achieved extraordinary feats
through hard work and good behavior.26 My project also explores how Soviet athletes modeled
ethical behavior. In contrast to Mertin’s work, however, I examine the presentation of Soviet
soccer players, who were more regularly covered by the media and arguably more well-known
than Olympic athletes.
Secondly, my project adds to the growing scholarship on sports in the Soviet Union. One
of the first historians to examine the Soviet system of sports was James Riordan. He worked as a
Russian linguistics professor in the United Kingdom but lived and studied in Moscow during the
1960s. Riordan’s 1977 study, Sport in Soviet Society, offers a detailed description of the structure
of Soviet athletics as well as the goals, such as physical fitness and conformity, that the Soviet

Erica L. Fraser, “Yuri Gagarin and Celebrity Masculinity in Soviet Culture.” In Gender, Sexuality, and the Cold
War, ed. Philip E. Muehlenbeck (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2017).
25
Julie Gilmour and Barbara Evans Clement. “If you want to be like me, Train!” In Russian Masculinities in History
and Culture, ed. Barbara Evans Clement, Rebecca Friedman, and Dan Healy (New York: Palgrave, 2002).
26
Evelyn Mertin “Presenting Heroes: Athletes as Role Models for the New Soviet Person,” The International
Journal of the History of Sport Vol. 26, Issue 4, 469-483. 2009.
24
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state sought to instill in the citizenry through sport. Riordan’s work, though comprehensive,
makes little argument for the effectiveness of Soviet sport programs. He does argue that athletic
organizations in the 1920s and 1930s prepared Soviet society for mobilization during World War
Two, but his analysis of the development of post-war sports programs is minimal. Instead,
Riordan’s focus remains on the structural formation of Soviet sport and his main contribution is
demonstrating that sport played an important part in Soviet life.27 In contrast to Riordan’s topdown view of sport in the Soviet Union, Robert Edelman takes a bottom-up approach to Soviet
sports. In Serious Fun: A History of Spectator Sports in the USSR, Edelman contrasts the state’s
priorities of sport with the public’s priorities.28 He argues that while the Soviet Union sought to
achieve victory in international competitions, especially the Olympics, the Soviet public did not
view Olympic champions as idols, but instead longed for more entertaining and higher quality
domestic sports. Edelman’s other major work is Spartak Moscow: A History of the People’s
Team in the Worker’s State, an analytical history of the players, coaches, and fans of one of the
most successful clubs in the Soviet Union.29 He argues that Spartak created a culture more
politically and culturally diverse than other Soviet teams and therefore became the favorite club
in Moscow and throughout the Soviet Union.
This thesis draws substantially on both Riordan’s and Edelman’s works. Each contains
information from archives otherwise inaccessible for my research. Edelman has also personally
conducted interviews with former players, coaches, and journalists to whom I would not have
access. However, this project differs from theirs through its singular focus on soccer.
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Additionally, my analysis of Soviet soccer extends to strategy and tactics, aspects of the game
rarely mentioned by Edelman or Riordan. Another difference, though minor, is Edelman’s
definition of the “Golden Age of Soviet Soccer.” In two of his works, he defines this period as
roughly 1945-1950, when soccer popularity dramatically increased following the end of World
War Two.30 However, I consider the “Golden Age of Soviet Soccer” as 1956-1966. During this
decade, soccer remained popular, featured the best years from soccer stars such as Igor Netto and
Lev Iashin, and were the most successful years for the Soviet national team.
Thirdly, this thesis interacts with literature concerning Soviet foreign policy and sport.
James Riordan continues his analysis on sport and the Soviet Union with “Sport and Soviet
Foreign Policy.” In this essay, Riordan states that sport served five distinct purposes within the
realm of foreign relations: To promote positive relations with pro-Soviet groups, to promote
neighborly relations with bordering states, to win support for the USSR in third world nations, to
reinforce the unity of the socialist community and the Soviet “vanguard” position within it, and
to attain global sporting supremacy. Riordan notes that international sport policy was always at
the whim of Soviet foreign policy. This caused frequent contradictions in international sport
policy, such as a fervent passion for Olympic tradition during the 1980 Moscow games, followed
by an enthusiastic boycott of the Olympics during the 1984 Los Angeles games.31 Even before
the boycotts of the 1980s, Olympic participation proved to be a complicated endeavor. In Red
Sport, Red Tape: The Olympic Games, The Soviet Sports Bureaucracy, and the Cold War, author
Jennifer Parks states that Soviet sports administrators were hesitant to join the Olympic
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movement for fear of defeat and subsequent embarrassment. It was only when Soviet officials
were confident that Soviet athletes would defeat Western, capitalist nations that they put their
support behind entry into the Olympics.32 Yet, few works address the soccer aspect of these
nations’ relationship. In Behind the Curtain: Travels in Eastern European Football, soccer
journalist documents the rise and fall of the Hungarian national teams and places the blame for
its disintegration on the Soviet Union but does little to provide a political context.33 In The
Franco Regime, Stanley Payne only briefly mentions how sport reflected Soviet-Spanish
relations. In response to Khrushchev’s criticism of his fascist regime, Franco boycotted the 1960
European Championship in order to prevent the Soviet team from traveling to Spain.34 This
thesis adds deeper analysis to Soviet sport and foreign policy, specifically regarding Hungarian
and Spanish relations. Furthermore, I argue that by boycotting tournaments and welcoming
Hungarian exiles, Franco used soccer as a method of retaliation against Soviet criticism.
Lastly, this thesis contributes to the emerging historiography of the connection between
sports, particularly soccer, and national identity. In Inverting the Pyramid: The History of Soccer
Tactics, Jonathan Wilson details how the culture and history of a nation has a direct influence on
the style of soccer adopted.35 Soccer historian David Winner examines the development of Dutch
soccer beginning in the 1950s. He argues that the unique style of soccer played by Ajax
Amsterdam and the Dutch national team were the result of the Dutch history of manipulating and
economizing land combined with the changing, free-thinking culture emerging in the 1960s and
70s.36 More recently, non-soccer historians have examined the link between soccer and culture.
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Laurent Dubois examines the French National Team as a microcosm for a French society
confronting the difficulties of unity and ethnic diversity.37 In Citizens and Sportsmen, Brenda
Elsey studies Chilean soccer at a local level and illustrates that both amateur and professional
teams were also politically active; therefore, those fans who supported a particular team were
declaring de facto allegiance to their preferred political party.38 The Country of Football is a
collection of articles by mostly Brazilian historians tracing how soccer has permeated nearly
every aspect of Brazilian life, politics, and economy. 39 This thesis incorporates many of these
themes as well, examining how the cultural and political changes of the 1950s and 60s
transformed Soviet soccer, how Soviet fans viewed ethnic non-Russian players, and how soccer
became a mode of political expression for both fans and players outside of traditional
governmental institutions.

Sources and Methodology
Soviet sport periodicals are the foundation of my research on questions surrounding
Soviet identity and soccer. Sovetskii Sport and Futbol i Khokkei are the publications I use the
most. Additionally, Pravda and Izvestia also covered important soccer events, such as
international tournaments and cup finals. The Soviet sport press coverage consisted of more than
only match reports. Players and coaches often gave interviews, explaining their training routine
or coaching philosophy. Soviet journalists also published brief biographies of soccer stars,
describing their personal and athletic development to becoming successful players. Lastly, sport
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periodicals frequently published fan letters, thus offering a window (albeit selective) into fans’
perspectives. Therefore, Soviet media provides more information into how soccer players and the
sport as whole was viewed than Western newspapers. I also use foreign newspapers to analyze
Western reactions to Soviet soccer abroad. American newspapers from this time period rarely
covered international soccer; therefore, I mostly use British newspapers such as The London
Times and The Glasgow Evening News.
In addition to press coverage, I use autobiographies and tactical guides written by Soviet
players and coaches. Many of the Soviet stars from the 1950s and 1960s wrote autobiographies
after their retirement. This includes Igor Netto, Nikita Simonian, and Lev Iashin, among others.
Coaches including Valeriy Lobanovskiy, Konstantin Beskov, and Mikhail Iakushin, wrote
autobiographies as well. During their careers, many coaches also wrote strategy books, outlining
their methods of coaching, player development, and tactical approach to soccer. These guides
reveal the reasons for their style of play and what they believe makes Soviet soccer different than
other approaches to the game of soccer.
Lastly, when possible, I analyze broadcast footage of matches as a third method of
evaluating the style of play used by Soviet teams. In large part, this match footage will only be
from international tournaments and involve the Soviet National Team. For this assessment, I am
relying on my experience playing soccer from childhood through playing on a university level
team to evaluate and distinguish between different offensive or defensive strategies and tactics.
In summation, one might not readily associate sports with culture and politics, but the
study of sport in the Soviet Union offers unique insights into cultural values and societal
changes. Soccer reveals the complexity of Soviet masculinity, the nature of Moscow’s
relationship with the periphery, and the importance of collectivism in everyday Soviet life.
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Ultimately, soccer reveals the changing image of what it meant not only to be a Soviet athlete,
but a Soviet citizen. Past studies of Soviet sports focused on sports other than soccer. However,
due to its popularity and ubiquity, Soviet soccer reflected the transformation of the Soviet Union
more profoundly than other sports.
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Chapter 1: Forging Heroes and Fighting Hooliganism: The Soccer Players as Model Soviets

In the 1956 Melbourne Summer Olympics, the Soviet national soccer team reached the
semifinals of the tournament through impressive play. Through the first three matches, the
Soviets outscored their opponents a combined six to one. The team’s success was a partial relief,
especially considering their failure of four years prior. The 1952 Helsinki Olympics were the
first games in which the USSR had competed. While the majority of the Soviet athletes fared
well in the Helsinki Olympics, the soccer team’s results did not meet the expectation of victory;
the team did not advance beyond the round of sixteen. They returned to the Soviet Union as
disappointments, and many of the players from the 1952 squad never played for the national
team again. Though the 1956 squad had surpassed the previous Soviet team, the goal was always
to win a gold medal.
In the semifinal match against Bulgaria, the likelihood of winning gold seemed out of
reach. Though the Soviets scored prolifically in their earlier matches, regulation time against
Bulgaria ended scoreless. In the first five minutes of extra-time, Bulgaria netted a go-ahead goal.
Scoreless for ninety minutes, the Soviets now had only twenty-five minutes to equalize. Many of
the Soviet players were fatigued; in the quarterfinals, the match against Indonesia ended in a
scoreless draw, forcing an extra game. The USSR comfortably won the replay match, but the
extra 90 minutes of play meant that the Soviet players on the field against Bulgaria were not as
fresh as their opponents. Among the Soviet players who had played the extra match was striker
Eduard Streltsov.
In the match against Bulgaria, Streltsov played well, but was unable to score during
regulation; his best attempt on goal sailed just high of the crossbar. With only eight minutes left
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in extra-time, Streltsov capitalized on a mistake by the opponents. Bulgaria failed to clear a ball
out of their half. Streltsov collected it in the middle of the field, dribbled towards goal, and
placed his shot out of the reach of the Bulgarian goalkeeper. After scoring the equalizing goal,
the match’s momentum shifted completely to the Soviets. Four minutes later, Streltsov took
possession near the touchline, beat his defender down the field, and crossed the ball in front of
goal. Teammate Boris Tatushin tapped the ball in, securing the Soviet Union a spot in the gold
medal game.40
The Soviet Union ultimately won gold at the 1956 Olympics. It was their first
international championship, but Streltsov was not on the field for the final. The Soviet coach
Gavriil Kachalin had a habit of starting forwards who played together at the domestic level.
Though Streltsov was fit, his teammate from Torpedo Moscow, Valentin Ivanov, had been
injured in the match against Bulgaria. As a result, Streltsov did not play in the championship
match. At the time, the Olympics only awarded medals to players who competed in the final.
Therefore, Streltsov did not receive a gold medal. His replacement, Nikita Simonian, offered him
the gold medal, but Streltsov refused. “Nikita,” he replied, “I will win many other trophies.”41
Unfortunately, this prediction did not come true. Before the next Olympics, Streltsov fell
out of favor with Soviet soccer administrators. Streltsov’s play was creative, but also aggressive.
In the second week of the 1957 season, Streltsov scored a match-winning goal against Spartak
Minsk. Only ten minutes from the start of the game, Streltsov won the ball in the middle of the
pitch and dribbled past two defenders before striking the ball into the goal; it would be the only
goal of the game. However, Streltsov was not the hero of the match. Twenty minutes after his
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goal, he violently fouled a Spartak Minsk midfielder, causing the referee to eject Streltsov from
the match.
Afterwards, discussion of the game revolved around Streltsov’s foul, not his goal.
Sovetskii Sport, the Soviet Union’s premier sports periodical, thoroughly condemned Streltsov’s
actions: “Can this man... a regular player for the USSR, be the hero of the match? No!”42 The
journalist went on to describe Streltsov’s as a “hooligan” and “bully,” and the foul as an
“outrageous act that spoiled the entire match.”43 The criticism came not only from sports writers.
In the following issues of Sovetskii Sport, soccer fans wrote letters to the newspaper to express
their dissatisfaction with Streltsov. “Although he scored the only goal,” wrote one fan, “he can
hardly serve as an example for athletes… He is a bully that violated the norms of
sportsmanship.” This fan emphasized a distinction between Streltsov and other Soviet soccer
icons. “We know many sportsmen who have won the respect and love of millions of fans…
Streltsov should learn from their example. ”44
The condemnation of Streltsov was not only focused on his egregious foul. Match
reports, editorials, and fan letters included criticism of his style of play. A sports journalist
deemed his play too “theatrical.”45 One fan described him as “Not a high-class soccer player, but
an arrogant master [barin], strolling about the field, waiting for the ball.”46 Therefore, the
disapproval of Streltsov was not only because of one particular foul, but stemmed from a popular
perception that Streltsov’s style of play put himself above his team. Fair play and responsibility
trumped success on the field; selfishness, laziness, and individualism had no place in Soviet
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soccer. The case of Eduard Streltsov raises the question: If Streltsov’s style did not reflect Soviet
soccer values, what type of play did?
In 1949, respected Soviet soccer coach Boris Arkadiev wrote an editorial previewing the
upcoming season and reflecting on past Soviet soccer achievements. He recalled the success of
Dinamo Moscow’s tour of Great Britain in 1945 and attributed the victory not just to tactics or
skill, but to the character of the Soviet team. He wrote: “…[Dinamo] brilliantly demonstrated the
original Soviet school of football which is so sharply distinct from foreign approaches… Above
all, it is the high moral and physical character of the players. It is a spiritual collectiveness of
play.”47 A year later, Sovetskii Sport echoed Arkadiev’s statements, writing “Collectivism is the
distinguishing characteristic of our football… What is the basis of the Soviet style? The answer
lies in collectivism, in close interaction; in the absence of iachestvo [me-ism].”48 Therefore, the
foundation of Soviet soccer was more than just formations, tactics, or training methods. It
emphasized collectivism, moral integrity, and an industrious, unselfish work ethic. The Soviet
school of soccer developed a distinct style, one derived from the coaches’ and players’ identity
as Soviet men and Soviet citizens.

Masculinity in Postwar Soviet Culture
World War Two devasted the population of the Soviet Union; the massive loss of life
most profoundly affected the populace of young men. Women filled both military and industrial
roles and attained prominence in both public and private spheres. Therefore, after the end of the
war, Soviet society was more feminine that ever, and in the eyes of Soviet officials, in need of
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“remasculinization.”49 In order to achieve this, Soviet men and boys needed masculine role
models to emulate. War heroes were natural choices, but athletes were also viable candidates. As
a result, depictions of sport in Soviet press after World War Two predominately displayed male
participation in sports.
The work of famed Soviet painter Alexander Deineka reflected this shift. His prewar
paintings encouraged mass participation in sports by both genders. Many of his works often
featured women participating in both casual and highly-organized athletics. However, his
postwar paintings emphasize masculine athletes. His 1947 painting Relay Race of Ring Road B
depicts a cross-country race in the outskirts of Moscow. Deineka includes three female athletes
in his scene, but each occupy a subsidiary role to their male teammates, literally passing them the
baton for the next leg of the race.50 In 1950, another Soviet artist Sergei Grigoriev received a
Stalin Prize for his work entitled The Goalkeeper. In this scene, the main figure is a young boy,
dressed in shabby clothing among the rubble of a war-torn city. He is set as if to face a penalty
kick, but the opposing player is out of frame. A crowd of other young children gather around the
scene in anticipation. The young goalkeeper’s face is stern as he stares at his opponent while the
two young girls who are included are completely removed from the athletic competition; they are
resigned to spectating and holding their baby dolls. The ruined cityscape suggests a desire to
return to normalcy whilst rebuilding from the war, and the strong, determined young boy is the
focal point of that reconstruction.51 Depictions of masculine figures saturated periodicals as well.
Postwar issues of Sovetskii Sport often featured illustrations of muscular men with young boys
emulating. These pictures focused on the discipline required to achieve such a physique. Slogans
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such as “If you want to be like me train” and “Train to make your body like steel.”52 Therefore,
the emphasis is not only on the end result, but also the process of masculinization.
However, Soviet masculinity was not only concerned with athleticism and physique. It
extended beyond the physicality to the morality of athletes. Soviet athletes’ actions were
expected to promote communist values, such as modesty, discipline, collectivism, and cultural
and political involvement. Whatever personal shortcomings or off-field issues occurred in the
lives of Soviet sport icons were ignored or covered up in order to preserve the image of an
incorruptible athlete.53 Overall, the Soviet concept of masculinity extended beyond simple
physical ability; it included a commitment to Soviet morals, political awareness, and engagement
with art and culture.

Ideological-Political Education
Such expectations for Soviet sportsmen extended to soccer players and coaches as well.
In postwar Soviet culture, soccer resumed quickly and regained its prewar popularity. Tens of
thousands of spectators routinely packed stadiums every week throughout the Soviet Union.
Therefore, in order to spread the ideals of Soviet masculinity through athletes, soccer players
were the most valuable due to their fame and visibility. Yet, in the first few years following the
end of the war, many players did not embody Soviet values. Fights, willful violations of rules,
harsh fouls, and a lack of respect for referees and coaches were commonplace throughout Soviet
soccer.
The Soviet Soccer Federation took on the responsibility of addressing the issue. They
feared that instead of adopting positive traits from Soviet players, fans would replicate the
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violence, disrespect, and unethical behavior they witnessed on the soccer field. The Soviet
Soccer Federation was comprised of proper Soviet citizens and communists, many of whom
were former soccer players or coaches.54 However, the Soviet Football Federation was under the
authority of the Committee of Physical Culture and Sport, which was not comprised of former
soccer players or athletes, but bureaucrats.55 It is difficult to determine how often the Committee
of Physical Culture and Sport overruled or forced decisions from the Soviet Soccer Federation,
but it is logical that the Soviet Soccer Federation better understood the intricacies and details of
soccer. Therefore, one organization focused on political ideology while the other focused on the
game itself, but both were responsible for the quality of Soviet soccer.
Soviet officials turned to education to fix the problem. They determined the reason
behind the uncouth behavior, and even poor athletic performance, was a lack of political
ideology. Consequently, coaches were now required educate players on Marxism-Leninism, lead
excursions to museums, and even read Stalin’s biography. Furthermore, the Soviet Soccer
Federation required coaches to provide detailed lists of the ideological-political education they
provided their players. In some cases, coaches were already including cultural and political
engagement as part of their training regimen. TsSKA (Central Sports Club of the Red Army)
head coach Boris Arkadiev had long been regarded as highly cultured and even read the poetry
of Alexander Blok to his players.56 In contrast, Dinamo Moscow coach Mikhail Iakushin did not
embrace ideological education. The minimal education he did provide centered around themes
that might practically affect his team’s performance, such as hygiene or muscle memory.57
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Additionally, USSR officials considered rough, unprincipled play a characteristic of
Western, anticommunist soccer. As a result, Soviet teams ceased any foreign competition
between 1948 and 1950. Officials even encouraged the Sovietization of soccer’s vocabulary.
Many terms were Russified versions of English terms, but Soviet officials believed that Russian
was a language “rich enough to express the appropriate concepts.” Therefore, khavbeck became
poluzashchitnik, forvard became napadayushchii, and gol’kiper became vratar. There was even
an effort to replace futbol with nozhnoi myach (the literal Russian translation of “football”).58
On the surface, it might seem the emphasis on ideological-political education worked. Dinamo
Moscow and their educationally negligent Iakushin often underperformed while the highly
cultured Arkadiev led TsSKA to five championships in the next six years. However, fouls, fights,
and a lack of respect for authority continued just the same.
The 1951 season in particular saw an increase in unsportsmanlike behavior from players
and coaches. Early in the season, Zenit Leningrad visited Dinamo Tbilisi. Midway through the
match, a Zenit player, Kratsev, intentionally stomped on his opponent’s foot. The referee ejected
Kratsev and suspended him for the following match as well. Naturally, Sovetskii Sport
disapproved the purposeful foul, but reserved its harshest condemnation for Zenit’s coach.
Following the match, Zenit players held a meeting, at which the manager was presumably
present, to discuss discipline. Still the coach ultimately appealed Kratsev’s suspension of the
next game. “What is the price of [the coach’s] ‘principled’ speech at the players’ meeting,” asked
a Sovetskii Sport journalist, “if he immediately intercedes for the violator of discipline?” The
report further argued that such appeals undermined the ideological education of the players: “The
case of Zenit indicates that not all football coaches are clearly aware of their tasks in the matter
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of educating players.”59 By midseason, a special meeting of the Soviet Soccer Federation
occurred to address disciplinary issues. They concluded that “as a result of the weakening of
control by the football department… insufficient attention is paid to the issues of political and
educational work” and increased the role of political commissars in teams’ educational
programs.60
This, however, was still not enough to stem the tide of unsportsmanlike behavior. The
most scandalous and embarrassing match of the season occurred only a month after the soccer
union’s meeting. Two high-profile clubs, Shakhtar Stalino and VVS Moscow, engaged in an
ugly and poorly played match. Early in the first half, Shakhtar captain Alexander Ponomarev
fouled an opposing defender. VVS’s captain, Konstantin Krizhevskii rushed towards Ponomarev,
striking the Shakhtar player and injuring him. Krizhevskii was consequently ejected from the
match and VVS had to play with only ten men of the field. Still, Shakhtar was unable to
capitalize. Though Ponomarev returned in the second, neither side scored. The best chance
occurred when Shakhtar winger Viktor Fomin broke through the defense but could not beat the
goalkeeper. Soviet reporters were quick to criticize Fomin’s squandering on an easy scoring
opportunity. Naturally, the poor play stemmed from a lack of Soviet values. “Donetsk soccer
players are hampered by Fomin’s extraordinary fascination with individual play… This young
soccer player has a dash of narcissism.”61 The only player praised by the press was the Shakhtar
goalkeeper, but even then, the compliment was tainted by concerns of individualism: “Brave
play, good reactions, successful positioning… Yet in rebuke, [Shakhtar’s goalkeeper] should put
aside the desire to be spectacular and acrobatic, which reduces the reliability of his game.”62
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The Shakhtar-VVS match was an embarrassment to the Soviet Soccer Federation for a
variety of reasons. First, many of the egregious fouls were committed by Soviet stars, not
mediocre players. Ponomarev led the Soviet league in goals scored that year and won the
Ukrainian Soccer Player of the Year award; Fomin had won the same award the previous year.
Krizhevskii captained a prestigious Moscow-based club and would later feature as a member of
the Soviet Union national team. Such unsportsmanlike behavior was unacceptable from any
Soviet player, let alone the top players in the league. Secondly, the match confirmed Soviet
officials’ belief that a lack of political education not only led to undisciplined actions, but also
poor performance. “Both teams played meticulously,” commented Sovetskii Sport, “but tactically
were boring.”63
The concerns over discipline and performance peaked in 1952. That summer, the Soviet
Union assembled its first national soccer team to compete in the Helsinki Olympics. TsSKA had
won five of the last six Soviet championships; therefore, Boris Arkadiev managed the national
team which also consisted of many of his own players, but also featured Dinamo Moscow striker
Konstantin Beskov and VVS’s Krizhevskii. Given Dinamo Moscow’s success in 1945 and a
general faith in the superiority of the Soviet athlete, hopes for victory in the Soviet Union were
high. However, the national team lost dramatically in the second round to Yugoslavia. The defeat
was so embarrassing Sovetskii Sport did not report on the game.64 Soviet officials attributed the
team’s failures to incompetent coaching by Arkadiev; not tactically, of course, but politically.
Officials described the cultured Arkadiev as an “apolitical intellectual” whose “constant use of
foreign words” hindered communication between him and his players.65 Ultimately, Arkadiev
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lost his honorary “Master of Sport” title; so too did Beskov and Krizhevskii. After the Olympics,
the 1952 season resumed, but to minimal coverage by the Soviet press. Several weeks into the
season, Sovetskii Sport finally published the league standings; TsSKA was not listed. The Soviet
Soccer Federation removed Arkadiev as coach, disbanded the team, and distributed its players to
other squads.
The Olympic defeat in Helsinki seemed to be proof of the need for ideological-political
education. The Soviet press blamed nearly every incident of harsh fouling or unskilled play on a
lack of ideological-political education. Even the top Soviet teams and players suffered from a
deficiency in such education; the national team, comprised of the best players and coaches the
USSR had, demonstrated that. In truth, however, it was the emphasis on education and, more
importantly, the avoidance of soccer outside the Soviet Union. The squad that travelled to
Helsinki, in general, was old. Many of the players had been playing for over a decade. The busy
schedule of an Olympic tournament, where games are more frequent than the season, quickly
tired the Soviet squad. Secondly, Arkadiev did not manage his aged players well, opting to start
nearly identical lineups in consecutive matches. Lastly, by not playing any matches against
foreign opponents in the years leading up to the Olympics, the Soviets either underestimated or
were ignorant of the skill of their opponents. Igor Netto, one of the few young players included
on the 1952 roster, concluded that the Soviet team was simply not skilled enough to win. “No
one was guilty,” he determined, “Simply we were not experienced enough, not very well
prepared, and inferior in teamwork to our rivals.”66 In 1945, Dinamo Moscow displayed a
different tactical approach to soccer which allowed them to dominate their British opposition.67
However, world soccer had changed and evolved since then, whereas Soviet soccer had not. The
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constant emphasis on ideological-political education ignored the importance of training and
conditioning, which is what the national teamed needed to succeed in the Olympic tournament.

The End of Stalinism and the Rebirth of Spartak
Entering 1953, the quality of Soviet soccer was deteriorating. The soccer stars of the past
decade, such as Vsevolod Bobrov, Konstantin Beskov, though still playing, had aged and lacked
the energy, strength, and skill they once possessed. The failure of the USSR national team the
previous summer shook the belief of Soviet officials and the public of the superiority of the
Soviet athlete and the value of ideological-political education. Fans still attended matches by the
tens of thousands, but their calls for something different grew louder and more frequent. Soviet
soccer needed to be transformed.
The first dramatic change in the 1953 season occurred roughly a month before the season
began. On March 5th, 1953, Joseph Stalin died. Stalin himself was, at best, only an intermittent
fan of soccer. However, Lavrentii Beria, formed head of the NKVD and close ally of Stalin, took
a great interest. He often manipulated the Soviet league through forcing unfair player transfers,
buying referees, and arresting opponents of his two favorite teams: Dinamo Moscow and
Dinamo Tbilisi.68 Yet, with Stalin dead, Beria’s influence decreased dramatically and by
midsummer, he was in prison. During the jostling for power in the Party, the emphasis of
ideological-political education declined, and teams were able to manage their players and
training as they saw fit. The Soviet Soccer Federation increased player wages, set high bonuses,
and allocated a larger percentage of ticket sales to the teams. Consequently, clubs could provide
better nutrition, transportation, and training facilities from their players with the additional

See James Riordan, “The Strange Story of Nikolai Starostin, Football and Levrentii Beria,” Europe-Asia Studies
Vol. 46, No. 4 (1994). 681-690.
68

31

money.69 The main beneficiary of Beria’s absence was Spartak Moscow, Dinamo Moscow’s
long-time rival. They had won the title by a slim margin in 1952, but due to a shortened schedule
to allow Olympic participation, the disbandment of TsSKA, and lackluster play, the Soviet press
barely celebrated their championship.
Spartak were favorites to repeat as champions. Their squad boasted a surplus of young,
creative talent unlike any other team in the league. Beginning in 1949, Spartak began
overhauling their roster. The first major move was bringing Abram Dangulov as coach.
Previously, the Armenian Dangulov had spent most of his career coaching in Southern Russia
and Ukraine before ending up in Moscow. Due to his ethnicity, Dangulov attracted other, nonRussian players from the periphery of the Soviet Union. Most notably, Dangulov brought in
Armenian striker Nikita Simonian and Estonian midfielder Igor Netto.
Simonian was a diminutive, but speedy, creative, and elusive center-forward. Black hair,
bushy eyebrows, and standing 5’7”, Simonian bore no resemblance to the Russian, masculine
athletes depicted by Deinka or Sovetskii Sport the decade before, nor did he look like previous
Soviet strikers like Bobrov or Beskov. Still, he became a star nonetheless. In his first year at
Spartak, he led the Soviet League with twenty-six goals in thirty-four matches.70 Netto was often
the creator of those goals. Born in Moscow to Estonian parents, Netto was tall, slim, lanky, and
had a long face with a large nose; he may have been more Russian than Simonian, but still did
not resemble the ideal Soviet athlete. Netto was physically slow but a skilled passer with
excellent vision and anticipation. As Spartak’s central midfielder, his ball possession and
accurate passes controlled the tempo of the game. Created by Dangulov and fueled by Simonian
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and Netto, Spartak played an attractive style of soccer founded on quick passing and ball
possession.
Dangulov left as manager prior to the start of the 1953 season, but his influence over
Spartak’s style remained. Furthermore, with the dissolution of TsSKA, Spartak gained
experienced defender Anatoly Bashashkin to shore up their defense, which had been a weakness
in previous years. Altogether, Spartak’s 1953 roster boasted an excellent balance of offense and
defense, creativity and discipline, and youth and experience. After starting the season slowly,
Spartak went on an unbeaten streak of high-scoring, exciting games. Spartak defeat Vilnius 7-0,
led by Simonian, described as the “initiator and leader…skillfully distributing the ball between
his partners, but at any moment, attacking sharply by himself.”71 Two games later, Spartak
soundly defeated third-place Zenit Leningrad; though he did not score, Simonian facilitated the
offense and assisted on two of the goals.72 Later that month, Spartak defeated second-place
Dinamo Tbilisi; this time Netto orchestrated the attack, playing a brilliant pass to set up an
opening goal for winger Anatolii Il’in. Spartak capitalized on the momentum and scored another
goal within the next four minutes.73 Spartak’s aggression proved effective, defeating Dinamo
Tbilisi 4-1 and impressing reporters with their style. “Spartak’s attackers displayed a purposeful
game and kept Dinamo’s goal under threat,” commented a journalist, “That’s how they must
play.”74 The victory over Dinamo Tbilisi proved to be much needed, as by the end of the season,
only a few points separated them from Spartak in first place. In the last week of the season,
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Dinamo Tbilisi had the opportunity to tie Spartak and force a playoff for the championship but
lost to third-place Torpedo Moscow, ensuring Spartak’s championship.75
Spartak’s electrifying 1953 campaign rejuvenated excitement and interest in soccer. Still,
the season was not without incidents of undisciplined play and rude behavior. Yet, the perceived
cause of such behavior began to shift. In the Spartak-Zenit match, a Zenit defender named
Severov harshly fouled Spartak winger Boris Tatushin. The reporter commented that because he
was “inferior in speed and technique [emphasis added] … Severov turned to unlawful
methods.”76 The journalist did not place blame for Severov’s actions on weak ideology, but an
inability to match Tatushin’s athleticism and skill; ideological-political education is never
mentioned. This change in perspective even reached Konstantin Andrianov, vice minister of
sport in the Soviet Union. In an editorial addressing the current state of Soviet soccer, Andrianov
emphasized the technical aspect of soccer, writing “We now have all the opportunities to
seriously improve the class of our teams if we quickly eliminate the shortcoming in the training
of our players.”77 This editorial was published only a few weeks after Spartak soundly defeated
Dinamo Tbilisi, and Spartak’s performance undoubtedly influenced Andrianov’s opinion; he
highlighted Spartak as a model for other Soviet clubs to emulate. “Spartak Moscow testifies to
the note that serious, methodical, and correct training can improve the game,” raved Andrianov,
“Spartak players now display a confident, technical, sharp game.”78 Overall, the concept of
ideological-political education did not end during 1953, but with less Party interference, coaches

75

The Torpedo-Dinamo Tbilisi match ended in controversy. Referee Nikolai Latyshev, known to favor Moscowbased clubs, officiated the match and made several dubious calls. If the match was indeed fixed, the motivation was
more so to keep Dinamo Tbilisi, home team of the not-yet-executed Beria, from winning the title rather than to
ensure Spartak’s title; any Russian team would have been favored over Dinamo Tbilisi. See Edelman, Spartak
Moscow, 207-208.
76
A. Kalinin, “Vesti ataki shirokim frontom.” Sovetskii Sport, 6.11.1953.
77
K. Andrianov, “Za vysokiy klass sovetskogo futbola,” Sovetskii Sport, 7.16.1953.
78
Ibid.

34

and reporters made more accurate assessments regarding player behavior. Soccer officials,
journalists, and coaches recognized that better coaching and conditioning produced better
disciplined players, not experts on Marxism-Leninism.
It was not only the skill and style that Spartak possessed, but the composition of the
roster that captured the imagination of Soviet journalists and spectators. Spartak was a team of
characters. Nikita Simonian and Igor Netto were the first non-Russian stars to lead a Moscowbased team. Many of the squad’s other players, though ethnically Russian, differed from the
classic image of Soviet masculinity. Not only was Simonian short, but the rest of Spartak’s
forwards were also diminutive: Aleksei Paramonov and Anatolii Il’in were 5’9”, while Boris
Tatushin was the smallest at only 5’6”. Yet, their slight figures did not hinder their passingbased style. Spartak may have been smaller than other squads, but they were more agile, quicker,
smarter, and better conditioned; they looked different and played different than their opponents.
Spartak’s uniqueness extended off the field as well. Whereas other clubs’ activities
included, albeit forced, excursions to museums, factories, or operas, Spartak players did not
prioritize ideological-political education. Instead, they enjoyed modern movies, music, and
women. In an interview, Simonian described the environment of Spartak. “There was a pavilion
at Taraskova [Spartak’s training facility] with a dance floor and a jazz band played there. People
came from Moscow to dance. Pretty girls came…For us, there was no control.”79 Spartak players
had more personality than players on other clubs, or at least, their personality was more public.
Simonian expanded on the culture of Spartak in his autobiography, writing “About Spartak
players of my generation, one can say this: Personality. Everyone in sight. Everyone drawing
attention. Everyone an individual.”80
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Figure 1: Simonian (far left) and Netto (far right) lead Spartak onto the field (Source: zvezda-fc.ru)

In a year of dramatic change across the Soviet Union, Spartak’s championship and
popularity was an indicator of the transformation of Soviet society and culture. Five years earlier,
TsSKA, a team of Russian, traditionally masculine, and indistinguishable soldiers had won the
championship. In 1953, it was an ethnically diverse squad of small players with big personalities.
Fans, especially the youth, were attracted to their style on and off the field.81 Perhaps fittingly, in
the year of Stalin and Beria’s death, Spartak, the team of the proletariat, triumphed over Dinamo,
the team of the secret police. Essentially, Spartak was a symbol of change, of challenging and
overcoming traditional organizations of authority, and of embracing individualism.

Lev Iashin and the Goalkeeper in Soviet Culture
Simonian, Netto, and the other Spartak players were not the only breakout stars of the
1953 season. Dinamo Moscow fielded a young roster that year as well. The key players of 1945
grew older, slower, and less skilled – including star goalkeeper Alexei Khomich who retired
from Dinamo in 1952. Over the next years and a half, Dinamo struggled to find a consistent
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goalkeeper, but finally settled on Iashin by midseason of 1953. With only a few games remaining
in the 1953 season, Spartak (a point behind Dinamo Tbilisi at this time) played third-place
Dinamo Moscow. As usual, Spartak’s forwards attacked aggressively and put consistent pressure
of Dinamo Moscow’s defense, but most attacks resulted in “an excellent shot that was taken by
the Dinamo goalkeeper Iashin.”82 Ultimately, the game ended in a 1-1 draw, though Spartak
dominated in ball possession and shots on goal. Iashin’s performance salvaged a draw for
Dinamo and essentially stole a victory away from Spartak. By the end of the season, Dinamo
Moscow finished fourth, but only allowed 19 goals, the second least in the Soviet League. Iashin
cemented himself as Dinamo’s first choice goalkeeper, a role he would retain for the next
seventeen years.
In contrast to Simonian and Netto, Iashin was a star that fit the traditional idea of a Soviet
man. He was tall, muscular, and commanding. He typically wore an all-black kit while in goal,
which only added to his imposing figure. Off the field, however, Iashin was soft-spoken
(sometimes preferring not to speak at all, especially to the press) and modest. He was not an
outsider establishing himself in Moscow but was born and raised in the capital city, working in
factories as a child during World War Two. Lastly, Iashin gained popularity not only through his
excellent play and masculine, Russian appearance, but also by playing the most respected
position in Soviet soccer: Goalkeeper.
More so than in most other nations, the goalkeeper occupied a special place in Soviet
sports culture. At first glance, the veneration of the goalkeeper might seem odd in the context of
Soviet society. Inherently, the goalkeeper is different. He is the only one playing his position, he
wears a different uniform than his teammates, and he even plays by a different set of rules. In
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Soviet society, the collective was of utmost importance, not individualism. Instead, the
goalkeeper represented more than an opportunity to distinguish one’s self from the collective. In
the Soviet Union, the goalkeeper was responsible for and accountable to the rest of collective.
Though he stood alone, the goalkeeper was the last line of defense. If the goalkeeper ignored his
responsibility, then he jeopardized the work of the rest of the team. Conversely, even if the team
failed, an extraordinary save could rescue the team from disaster. The concept of a single
individual, standing alone against enemies, saving the collective appealed to many Soviets who
also feared capitalist encirclement and ever-present enemies within society.
Admiration of the position began even before the Bolshevik Revolution though. In his
memoir, Vladimir Nabokov recalls being “crazy about goalkeeping” as a young boy. “In
Russia…the crack goalie is followed in the streets by entranced small boys… He is the long
eagle, the man of mystery, the last defender.” Nabokov even suggests that there a distinct
Russian aspect to goalkeeper. While studying at Cambridge in England, he reflected “The
[English] national dread of showing off” was “not conducive to the development of the goalie’s
eccentric art.”83 Nabokov was not the only literary icon to admire and play goalkeeper. Yuri
Olesha played semi-professionally before a medical diagnosis prevented him from competing
further. In Envy, Volodia Makarov is perhaps the heroic goalkeeper Olesha desired to be but
could not become. As a youngster in the Soviet Union, Yevgenii Yevtushenko favored
goalkeeper over other positions. On one occasion, against an older team infamous for cheating
and roughness, Yevtushenko won the game by saving a penalty kick. “The captain of the
Destroyers [the opposing team] spun the ball in his hands, slapped it on its dies, spat upon it and
put it on the penalty spot. I got myself ready,” recalled Yevtushenko, “I felt a sharp blow on my
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face, then another then a third. The fans of the Destroyers were shooting small stones at me from
slingshots…I was half blind from the pain and could practically nothing…I don’t know how it
happened, but the ball ended up in my hands.”84 Such an event seems dramatized, but possible.
However, the end of the game, when Yevtushenko dribbles the ball from his own goal through
the opposing team before scoring the winning goal, the story seems implausible. Regardless of
the veracity of the story, it captures the romantic image of the goalkeeper: alone, outnumbered,
with the odds stacked against him, yet finding a way to triumph.
This image of the goalkeeper was pervasive in the Soviet public beginning in the 1930s.
If Yevtushenko did indeed embellish his story, he likely drew inspiration from the 1936 film
Goalkeeper. Based on Lev Kassili’s novel The Goalkeeper’s Republic, the film follows young
goalkeeper Anton Kandidov, a peasant boy discovered by a soccer scout while catching
watermelons thrown from a cart. Kandidov eventually earns the starting goalkeeper position for
an unnamed Russian squad. In the culmination of the film, Kandidov and his teammates host the
sinister looking “Black Buffaloes,” whose uniforms bear Fascist symbolism. Kandidov makes
save after save until, in the last minute of the match, he is forced to save a penalty shot. Not only
does he save the penalty, Kandidov races down the pitch to score the winning goal before time
expires. As fans rush onto the field and adorn Kandidov with flowers, the chorus drives home the
political message of the film: “Hey, goalkeeper, prepare for the fight. You are a sentry in goal.
Imagine there is a border behind you!”85
The politicization of goalkeepers turned unfortunately real during World War Two.
During 1942 in Nazi-occupied Kiev, the Germans organized a soccer tournament which included
a local Ukrainian team. The Ukrainian squad trounced its axis opponents before finally defeating
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the German garrison team in the final. The Germans order a replay and were determined not to
lose. In the rematch, the Ukrainians again raced out to a two-goal lead by halftime. No one is
quite sure exactly what occurred at halftime, but myth suggests that the Ukrainian team was
warned they would face severe punishment if they won again. It was Mykola Trusevych, the
team’s goalkeeper, who gave an inspiring speech encouraging his teammates to continue to fight
for victory. In the end, the Ukrainian team prevailed again. The players were then sent to prison
camps where by February of the following year, several of them, including Trusevych, were
killed.86 The legend surrounding what came to be known as the “Death Match” was likely untrue
or at least highly embellished, but the public was enchanted by the tale, even years after the war
ended.87
In 1945, Dinamo Moscow goalkeeper Alexei Khomich finally gave Soviet soccer fans a
tangible figure to rally around. As a member of the team that toured Britain in 1945, Khomich
excited both Soviet and British fans with his athleticism and bravery. In the following years,
Khomich’s performance in the Soviet League cemented his status as the greatest Soviet
goalkeeper. However, not long after Khomich retired from Dinamo, Iashin quickly challenged
that distinction, leading Dinamo Moscow to the Soviet League title in 1954. Throughout the rest
of the 1960s, Spartak and Dinamo Moscow battled each other for titles. From 1953 through
1963, either Dinamo Moscow or Spartak won the championship nine out of the eleven seasons;
Dinamo winning five, Spartak four. The Dinamo-Spartak rivalry benefited not only from the
superiority of the two clubs, but from their contrasting styles as well. Spartak maintained their
offensive-minded approach while Dinamo relied on Iashin and a stingy defense. Amazingly, in
championship winning years, Iashin averaged less than a goal per game allowed.
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Iashin’s success propelled him to the status of the Soviet Union’s most popular soccer
player. The Party decreasingly emphasized ideological-political education, but nevertheless, did
not mind when players exemplified and promoted Soviet values themselves. Iashin refused to
drink alcohol and, though he admitted to a smoking habit, acknowledged that it was unhealthy
and a bad example to those who idolized him. When asked by a journalist if he would consider
playing for Real Madrid if they paid him a salary of 100,00 (in which currency was unspecified),
Iashin stoutly declined, replying “I would not hesitate to refuse, since I do not imagine myself to
be anywhere other than Russia…I feel sorry for those soccer players, who because of money, are
forced to play in foreign countries.”88 In one reply, Iashin displayed his commitment to both his
country and Soviet values. Consequently, he was rewarded by the Party for his service through
many award, including the Order of Lenin and the Order of the Red Banner of Labor. The most
prestigious award of Iashin’s career, however, did not come from the Party. The 1963 season was
memorable for Iashin and all Soviet soccer fans. It was Iashin’s best year of his career, starting
twenty-seven matches and only allowing six goals; Such extraordinary goalkeeping propelled
Dinamo to the championship. Even outside the Soviet Union, Iashin’s performance caught the
attention of sports journalists. In honor of his 1963 season, France Football award the Ballon
d’Or (Golden Ball) to Lev Iashin as the best player in European Soccer. Naturally, the Soviet
press was ecstatic. “The conclusion is unanimous,” wrote the editor of Futbol i Khokkei, “The
majority of soccer observers gave their votes to the representative of the Soviet goalkeeping
school… Soviet soccer fans have long appreciated the work of the Dinamo goalkeeper. This
prize is another testament of his class.”89 In a way, the award was not solely for Iashin; it was for
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Soviet soccer as a whole, a justification for the Soviet method and a coronation for the
superiority of the Soviet sportsmen.

Figure 2: Iashin on the cover of Futbol i Khokkei after receiving the Ballon D'or (Source :Futbol i Khokkei, 5.31.1964)

Eduard Streltsov: Victor and Villain
While Dinamo Moscow and Spartak fought for superiority in Soviet soccer, a third,
lesser-known team was gathering interest from fans as well. Torpedo Moscow, though based in
the capital, had traditionally been on the outside of the Soviet soccer elite. However, the club
began to achieve success in the postwar period. Year after year, the club crept up the final
standings. Similar to Spartak, Torpedo brought in many young players that did not fit the
traditional image of a Soviet sportsmen. Without a doubt, the most talented young player in the
Torpedo team was Eduard Streltsov.
Streltsov debuted for Torpedo in 1954, but exploded in 1955, netting fifteen goals and
leading the Soviet League scoring at the age of eighteen. That same year, he debuted for the
national team. His first game was a friendly match against Sweden; Streltsov scored a hattrick
within the first half. Ultimately, he scored seven goals in his first four games representing the
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Soviet Union.90 Such productivity made Streltsov an obvious inclusion for the Soviet team that
travelled to Melbourne for the 1956 Olympics. The USSR won the gold medal with significant
contributions from Streltsov.
Yet, the Soviet press did not praise and adore Streltsov as they did other players. In
comparison with Iashin, Streltsov was the complete opposite. Iashin prevented goals; Streltsov
scored them. Iashin was stoic, a family man, and abstained from alcohol; Streltsov was
extroverted, a womanizer, and heavy drinker. His skill in dribbling and passing resembled that of
Simonian or Netto, but Streltsov played more individually than his Spartak comparisons. The
criticism of Streltsov peaked in 1957. Early in the season during a match against Spartak Minsk,
Streltsov, who as a striker was frequently roughed up by opposing defenders, retaliated against
one such opponent. Streltsov violently tackled a Spartak Minsk player with both feet, studs up,
prompting the referee to eject Streltsov.
Torpedo won the match, coincidentally from a Streltsov goal scored twenty minutes
before he was sent off, but the commentary of the game revolved around his foul and ejection.
Sovetskii Sport quickly condemned the action, which was even more egregious due to Streltsov’s
status as a national team player. “Can this man... a regular player for the USSR, be the hero of
the match? No!”91 The journalist went on to describe Streltsov as a “hooligan” and “bully,” and
the foul as an “outrageous act that spoiled the entire match.”92 The incident even elicited a
response from the editorial staff of Sovetskii Sport. “The last match showed that even the leading
masters of [soccer] can behave unsportsmanlike on the field; they allow crude, hooligan antics,”
the article lamented, before ending with the proclamation, “It’s time for them to finish!”93
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Soviet soccer fans added to the condemnation of Streltsov through letters written to the
paper. Many degraded him as an example for Soviet youth and encouraged him to look for his
own role models in Soviet soccer. “Although he scored the only goal,” wrote one fan, “he can
hardly serve as an example for athletes… He is a bully who violated the norms of
sportsmanship… We know many sportsmen who have won the respect and love of millions of
fans… Streltsov should learn from their example.”94 Even Torpedo Moscow fans joined the
criticism. One such fan wrote, “We remain of the opinion that Streltsov is good, but appreciating
the player, we cannot pass by the shameful act that happened…Let’s hope Streltsov realizes his
guilt and never does something like that again.”95 It was not simply his violent foul, however, the
drew the ire of soccer enthusiasts. Sovetskii Sport judged his play too “theatrical.”96 The Torpedo
Moscow supporter blamed Streltsov’s foul on his “harmful self-assuredness, and the loss of a
sense of responsibility.”97 The worst aspect of the foul, resolved one fan, was the ejection, which
left Streltsov’s team a man short for the rest of the match. 98 Ultimately, fans and reporters
concluded that Streltsov acted selfishly, choosing a personal act of revenge over the well-being
of his own team.
The animosity towards Streltsov was unprecedented. Many players, as already shown,
received admonishment for undisciplined behavior, but never to the scale of Streltsov. Still, the
season progressed, Streltsov continued to score, and Torpedo achieved a second-place finish,
their highest at that time. In the offseason, Streltsov resumed training with the national team in
preparation for next summer’s World Cup. However, disciplinary issues did not go away. In
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January 1958, Streltsov was involved in a fight with police in the Moscow Metro and convicted
of minor-hooliganism; he spent three days in jail before being released. The Soviet Soccer
Federation revoked his position with the national team until he apologized for the scuffle.99 The
most peculiar and controversial event in Streltsov’s life occurred in May of 1958. The day after
attending a party with two other national squad teammates, a woman with whom Streltsov spent
the night accused him of rape. He was arrested, then missed the 1958 World Cup while awaiting
trial. Ultimately, Streltsov was convicted, banned from Soviet soccer for lie, and sentenced to
twelve years in a Siberian labor camp.
Theories about that night abound, some more conspiratorial than others. Streltsov did
offer a confession, albeit under the interrogation of Soviet police, so it is possible he did commit
the crime. Others posit that the conviction was further retaliation for his unsportsmanlike play
and attitude. One theory suggests that Soviet authorities worried about Streltsov defecting during
the World Cup in Sweden, while another theory postulates he offended the daughter of a
Politburo member and was therefore a “marked man.” Another cites Streltsov’s refusal to
transfer to Dinamo Moscow as the cause.100 Whatever the truth behind Streltsov’s case, his poor
persona in the Soviet press did him no favors. His character and past actions allowed the public
to at least imagine Streltsov committing the crime. Such behavior would never have been
thought of as possible for Iashin, Simonian, or Netto.
Streltsov ended up serving only five years of his twelve-year sentence. He returned to
Moscow in 1963 but did not immediately return to the field; his ban from soccer was still in
effect. In 1964, after Khrushchev’s removal from power, the Soviet Soccer Federation lifted his
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suspension. That year, he intermittently played with Torpedo, but only joined the club as a fulltime player for the 1965 season. His impact was immediate. In contrast to the villainous
portrayal of him from 1957, Streltsov was the story of the season in 1965. Valentin Ivanov,
Streltsov’s partner in attack, recalled Streltsov’s return and noted that the camps hadn’t changed
him as a player: “It only made him bolder. He still had his health, and talent is talent. He was the
best player in the USSR.”101 Torpedo Moscow won the Soviet Championship, and Streltsov led
the team with twelve goals. Despite Ivanov’s declaration of Streltsov’s supremacy, at the end of
the year, his Torpedo teammate Valerii Voronin won Soviet Soccer Player of the Year; Streltsov
finished second.102
After the 1967 season, Streltsov won the award. Ironically, Torpedo only finished twelfth
that season and Streltsov’s performances were uninspiring. Still, that summer he rejoined the
Soviet national team for several exhibition matches and played well. Perhaps the image of
Streltsov donning the red jersey with “CCCP” across the chest was too captivating to ignore,
perhaps the award was an apology for his severe punishment, or possibly Streltsov’s style of play
appealed to the Soviet press. The time spent in labor camps likely almost certainly took a toll on
Streltsov’s body. Only in his late twenties at the time of his return, he looked thin, balding, and
was slower than before. Instead of playing strictly as a striker, Streltsov occasionally dropped in
the role of central midfielder where his diminished quickness was not as much of a weakness.
Journalists seemed to embrace this new role and emphasized his teamwork, vision, and
passing ability just as much as his dribbling and shooting. While admitting Streltsov still
possessed “some unusual flair,” a reported praised his teamwork: “He sees the field
perfectly…He instantly notices a partner’s opening, or rather, picks the opportunity for his
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partner to go to a free area and immediately sends the ball there.”103 His new style displayed less
aggression and more patience. “They say that Streltsov’s technique is not as intricate [as other
players],” commented the same journalist, “That he cannot ‘untwist’ himself from defenders…
he does not try. When there are defenders near him, he immediately pushes to a comfortable
position for his teammates.”104 Streltsov’s play finally fit the mold of a Soviet sportsmen; he
combined his excellent skill with restraint and unselfishness.
Streltsov won the award the following year too, though this time it was well-deserved;
Torpedo Moscow finished third and Streltsov netted twenty-one goals, only one shy of the
league leaders. Streltsov’s image increasingly softened and conformed to the expectations of
Soviet officials. In the issue celebrating his second award, the headline photograph was not an
action shot or even Streltsov in a soccer jersey, but him playing with his young son, showing
Streltsov as a mature and modest Soviet player; similar images of Iashin with his family had
been published in Soviet newspapers.105 Streltsov authored an editorial (another signifier that he
achieved the status of a proper Soviet sportsmen) in which reflects on his career and offers
advice, and criticism, to young players and fans. “I notice young players… sit and do not
perceive anything,” criticized Streltsov, in a reversal of roles. “The young players refer to soccer
as a tedious job; they come, run around without much thought, take a shower, get a haircut, tie
their tie, and that’s it.” 106Oddly enough, Streltsov never mentioned his rape conviction nor his
time in labor camps. Perhaps the editor redacted those sections, or Streltsov decided not to write
about it, but whatever the case, he did not include it as a defining part of his life in soccer.
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Figure 3: Steltsov with his son (Source: Futbol i Khokkei, 12.29.1968)

Figure 4: A similar photo of Iashin with his family (Source: Futbol i Khokkei, 1.1.1966)

Streltsov ended his career in 1970 as one of the most admired, but also controversial figures in
Soviet sports, let alone soccer. What Streltsov’s story reveals is the importance of conduct and
public perception. Certainly, Streltsov was not the first sportsman to play aggressively and let his
emotions get the best of him, but none were stars like Streltsov. He was also not the first to drink,
womanize, or even have an extramarital affair, but his indiscretions were more public and
shocking. Overall, his career and life were characterized by extremes: extreme talent and skill,
along with extreme criticism and punishment.

Socialist Spectators
Of course, the goal of presenting soccer players as exemplary Soviet citizens was to
influence spectators and fans to replicate their behavior. Soviet officials wanted soccer fans to
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display the same Soviet values as players: Modesty, restraint, loyalty, and education. Just as
Soviet officials desired soccer players to differentiate themselves from their Western
counterparts though a discipline and collective style of play, so too did they want Soviet fans to
distinguish themselves from Western spectators, namely with respect to hooliganism and
violence. Throughout much of the world, soccer matches served as venues for protests, riots,
fighting, and rudeness. In his memoir of soccer fandom in 1960s England, Nick Hornby recalls
visiting a stadium for the first time as a young boy. It was not the players or the size of the
stadium that impressed him, but the ferocity and anger of the fans. He remembers that “adults
were allowed to shout the word ‘WANKER’ as loudly as they wanted with attracting any
attention.” Overall, the environment of the stadium hostile and aggressive. “What impressed me
the most was just how much most of the men around me hated, really hated, being there.”107 This
was this sort of environment that Soviet officials sought to prevent.
It is difficult to know if, on an individual level, fans emulated the ideological-political
education of the players. On a mass scale, however, the results were mixed. In the late 1940s and
early 1950s, match-day environments were chaotic, especially in Moscow. The Moscow Metro,
according to Sovetskii Sport, “turned out to be helpless before the unstoppable avalanche of
soccer lovers.”108 Scalpers and hooligans routinely monopolized the availability of tickets. “You
can’t even line up for tickets when they go on sale,” complained a young Dinamo Moscow fan,
“Adults threatened to run us off.”109 Often, Soviet police did nothing to stop the speculators and
aggressive crowds.110 At times though, there was a notable difference between Soviet and
Western fans. Many journalists reported fans showing respect and appreciation towards the
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opposing team for a well-played match, even if the home team lost the game. However, such
appreciation rarely occurred outside of Moscow. In the capital, fan loyalties depended less on
geographic location and more on other influences. In provincial cities, fandom was not a choice;
most cities only had one team. Therefore, the objectivity displayed in Moscow was not common
in the rest of the Soviet Union.
In general, Soviet fans displayed the same passion and intensity as those in the West.
“They are joyful to the depths of their souls with the victory of their team, and they suffer with
each of its defeats,” a Sovetskii Sport editor described, “Everyone can see their joy and their
pain.” However, it seems Soviet fans displayed the same hatred and anger Hornby experienced.
“They are open in the expression of their feelings… Loving their team, they are harsh and
demanding towards it.”111 Overall, the emphasis on political-ideological education and discipline
did not translate to the Soviet spectators.
Soviet officials succeeded in subduing acts of mass, organized violence. Whatever
rudeness and fighting occurred in Soviet stadiums largely occurred as individual incidents,
whereas organized supporters and gangs instigated riots in Western nations. The only notable
mass act of violence occurred in the beginning of the 1954 season. Dinamo Tbilisi hosted
Spartak Moscow to open the season. Fans of Dinamo Tbilisi, believing the previous season had
been rigged to ensure they did not win the title, overcrowded the stadium and rioted. Twenty
people perished, and the NKVD was forced to restore order. Despite the violence, the match
continued, Dinamo Tbilisi won 2-1, and the match report contained no mention of rioting.112 The
absence of organized violence may appear to be a victory for ideological-political education, but
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in fact, it was more the result of a Soviet laws combating hooliganism. Beginning in 1956,
Khrushchev increased the scope of hooliganism laws to target petty hooliganism.113 As
illustrated by Western soccer hooligans, such supporter groups rarely limit their violence to
stadiums, but fight in pubs, train stations, and in the street as well. By targeting the minor forms
of hooliganism, Soviet authorities were able to keep hooligans from organizing and rioting on a
mass scale.
A characteristic common in soccer fans throughout the world is loyalty. Soviet officials
especially emphasized this aspect of fandom. Soviet soccer players, especially star players, rarely
transferred teams. Furthermore, Soviet players did not accept, nor even entertain, offers to play
for clubs outside the Soviet Union. Likewise, fans did not abandon their favorite teams and
though scores from foreign leagues were included in Sovetskii Sport and Futbol i Khokkei, they
were resigned to the back pages while the Soviet League dominated the issue. In a way, loyalty
to a local club was analogous to loyalty to the nation. Thus, soccer fandom was a microcosm of
patriotism.
Soccer loyalty in the Soviet Union was more complicated and nuanced than in many
Western countries, though. Soviet clubs were not privately owned, but operated by government
sponsored organizations, TsSKA by the military, Dinamo clubs around the USSR by the NKVD,
and Torpedo by the ZIL automotive factory. Spartak Moscow stood out among most clubs due to
their sponsorship by trade unions, took on the moniker of “The People’s Team,” and quickly
became the most popular team in the Soviet Union. In a way, allegiance to Spartak became a
form of resistance against the Soviet state. Similar to Hornby’s observation that English fans
could yell expletives without repercussions, Spartak fans could shout “kill the cops” or “kill the
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soldiers” when Spartak played Dinamo or TsSKA.114 Outside of Moscow, soccer fans did not
have much option to choose their favorite team. In Rostov, Kuybyshev, or Tashkent, for
example, only one team existed. Circumstances forced fans to follow their local team, no matter
their opinion of the team’s sponsor.

The Impact of Television
Beginning in the mid-1950s, the popularity of television expanded the Soviet soccer fan’s
world dramatically. Televised soccer matches were another medium through which Soviet
authorities could promulgate the image of the soccer players as the ideal Soviet man, especially
regarding physical masculinity which was difficult to convey through newspapers and radio.
Live games or soccer coverage usually occupied prime timeslots in the Soviet programming
schedule. In her history of Soviet media, historian Kristin Roth-Ey comments “Sports, however
entertaining for the viewer, still held out the opportunity for educational and ideological work in
a Soviet context…Sports on Soviet TV had no less place as educational programming than did
Verses of Italian, German, and Spanish Poets [the program which followed a soccer match].”115
However, while television allowed Soviet values to reach a wider audience, television also
undermined the goals of promoting sportsmanship and loyalty. Before televised matches, fans
were reliant on radio commentators and journalists for information; the reporter controlled what
details reached fans. Therefore, fouls or fan behavior could be either embellished or ignored to
create a narrative suitable for Soviet officials. Televised soccer, often broadcast live, removed
that control and viewers could interpret events as they happened.
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Additionally, television exposed fans in the periphery to the same information and
entertainment as fans in Moscow. Therefore, provincial fans now had the same choice to support
a club not solely based on geographic proximity but based on their own interests and identity.
Theoretically, fans in Tbilisi could now follow Zenit Leningrad, Shakhtar Stalino, or Dinamo
Misnk with the same enthusiasm as Dinamo Tbilisi. It might be thought that the fan culture in
Moscow would replicate throughout the country and Spartak’s popularity would only increase.
However, fans from around the Soviet Union gravitated to another club, Dinamo Kiev. To many
citizens, any Moscow-based team, including Spartak, represented Soviet authority. By the early
1960s, Dinamo Kiev was the best non-Moscow club in the nation, winning the Soviet League
title in 1961 and then again in 1966. When Dinamo Kiev successful claimed the title in 1966,
fans letters congratulating them for their victory arrived from Kiev, but also Estonia, Leningrad,
and Baku. Television had allowed these fans to create a transregional community with the Soviet
Union. In his letter, a young Leningrad fan wrote, “In front of our television sets we
applauded…together with thousands of your fans.”116 By the mid-1960s, Moscow was no longer
the soccer capital of the Soviet Union. Kiev, as well as cities in Southern Russia and the
Caucasus, boasted better teams than those in Moscow. Soviet officials feared that if fans lost
their loyalty and respect of Moscow regarding soccer, they could soon abandon their allegiance
politically too.
Television not only introduced fans to new teams across the Soviet Union, but also
exposed them to international teams like never before. Of course, Soviet fans were aware of
famous players and clubs from back page reports in newspapers. When the Soviet national team
engaged in international competition, fans marveled at the talents of players like Pele, Eusebio,
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and Just Fontaine. In 1965, Soviet clubs began competing in European competitions and Soviet
fans experienced, if only through their television sets, the environments of Western soccer
stadiums. Many fans were fascinated by Western soccer and its characteristics. Possibly wary of
readers becoming fans of these foreign teams, these articles maintained a focus on Soviet teams
and soccer culture.
When Torpedo Moscow played Inter Milan in the first round of the 1966 European Cup,
Sovetskii Sport interviewed Inter coach Helenio Herrera. Based on the questions asked of him, it
was clear the Soviet interviewer wanted Herrera, one of the most respected coaches in the soccer
world, to compliment the Soviet Union and its soccer. “How has Moscow welcomed you?” and
“What do you think of Central Lenin Stadium?” were just two questions asked of Herrera which
had nothing to do with his team or the upcoming match. The interview ended awkwardly when
the reporter asked if Herrera though the USSR could win the next World Cup, to which Herrera
curtly replied, “You need to ask them.”117 Soccer fans gained a general idea of international
soccer through these reports but received a much more vivid impression by watching matches on
TV. Foreign players had long hair, beards and goatees, jerseys manufactured by Adidas and
Puma, and did not tuck in their jerseys. During this period, it was not uncommon for players to
argue with coaches on the sideline or refuse to be substituted. This sharply contrasted with the
short-haired, clean shaven, obedient Soviet players. Furthermore, when Soviet teams travelled to
play abroad, fans saw advertisements alongside the pitch (for products unavailable in the Soviet
Union) and rowdy soccer fans who were unafraid to resort to violence. In an interview with
Soviet sport historian Robert Edelman, Nikolai Dolgopolov, a journalist for Komsomol’skia
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Pravda and Trud, summed up his impression of watching international matches, remarking “We
saw things we never had seen before in our lives.”118
Despite a general environment of rowdiness, Soviet fans never witnessed mass-scale
rioting during the 1960s, but Soviet officials’ fears became reality during the 1972 season.
Dinamo Moscow reached the final of Europe Cup Winner’s Cup. In the championship match,
hosted in Barcelona’s Camp Nou Stadium, they faced Glasgow Rangers. It was the first time a
Soviet club had reached a final since entering international tournaments and excitement was
high; naturally, the match was show live on Soviet television. Excitement quickly subdued,
however, as Rangers jumped out to a 3-0 lead just after the start of the second half. Still, Dinamo
kept playing hard and mounted a comeback, scoring twice. With only minutes before the end of
the match, Dinamo put intense pressure on Rangers’ defense and it seemed that a tying goal was
imminent. With only a minute left, a Rangers midfielder fouled a Dinamo forward; the referee
blew his whistle to indicate a free kick, but the thousands of Rangers fans who traveled from
Glasgow thought the referee had ended the game. They rushed the field in enthusiastic, chaotic
celebration. After several minutes, the crowd was cleared, but whatever momentum Dinamo had
was lost. Rangers possessed the ball for the last few minutes and when the real end of the match
was whistled, even more Rangers fans toppled the stadium’s fences and poured onto the pitch.
The underequipped security force responded with force and a riot erupted between the Spanish
police and thousands of Rangers fans.119
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Naturally, the Soviet press firmly condemned the fans’ actions. The initial storming of
the field, from a Soviet perspective, was a deliberate attempt to stall Dinamo’s momentum.
“After a long pause, when the field was cleared, the referee decided to play,” reported Futbol i
Khokkei, “but in a sporting sense, the fight was not there in the last three minutes.”120 The
recently retired Lev Iashin commented that Dinamo “would have been successful if the fans had
not run out onto the field.”121 This unruly behavior was the natural culmination of unruly
behavior from the Rangers supporters. The Soviet press highlighted the hostile behavior:
“Throughout the match, [Rangers fans] threw seat cushions, bottles, and all sorts of objects onto
the field. The outrage of the hooligans continued after the match; there were victims and there
were arrests.”122 Despite the harsh condemnation by the Soviet press (which was printed days
after the event), those watching the match live were able to make their own assessment of the
match and the foreign fans’ behavior. The worst aspects of soccer hooliganism were broadcast
directly into Soviet living rooms without a radio announcer or journalist to interpret the scenes
for the Soviet audience.
In all, televised soccer was a double-edged sword, simultaneously promoting and
undermining Soviet values. Soviet authorities used television as another avenue to promote
sportsmanship, masculinity, and patriotism by promoting Soviet soccer stars and teams directly
in homes. In contrast, Soviet fans received the ability to choose their own heroes, their own
favorite teams, and make their own comparisons between Soviet and Western soccer.
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Conclusion
Soccer’s popularity exploded in the two and half decades following the end of World
War Two. Its prewar popularity and the inherent simplicity of the game allowed soccer to come
back in devastated regions quicker than other sports. The ubiquity of soccer meant it was an
appropriate and effective medium to promote Soviet values of sportsmanship and masculinity to
the public. However, controlling the image of the nation’s most popular sport was difficult. Since
the ideological-political education of players was connected to their performance on the field,
Soviet officials, reporters, and fans had to criticize a team’s educational efforts. This led to
deemphasis in the importance of training. When the USSR national team disappointed in the
1952 Olympics, even the game’s top stars and coaches fell under reproach; if the best Soviet
players were not educated, then the competence of the entire Soviet Soccer Federation lost
credibility.
Fortunately, the early 1950s saw the rise of a new generation of Soviet players. Many of
these new stars did not fit the typical image of Soviet masculinity. Spartak Moscow embraced a
style of prioritized quickness over strength and skill over size. Through Nikita Simonian and Igor
Netto, Spartak’s style led them to multiple championships throughout the 1950s. In addition to
diverting from the tradition of typical masculine players, Spartak also rejected the connection
between education and success on the field; the team could not completely abandon educational
efforts but emphasized training and skill development which improved their technical style of
soccer.
In contrast to Spartak’s style, Dinamo Moscow found success through a defensive
approach to the game. They contrasted their rivals further through the figure of Lev Iashin, who
position, appearance, and demeanor fit the tradition of a Soviet sportsman. Most of all, more than
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his persona, Iashin’s stellar performances for both club and country that established him as a
Soviet star. Eduard Streltsov had the potential to equal or even surpass Iashin’s stature. Like the
Dinamo goalkeeper, he looked the part and excelled on the field. However, guilty of rape or not,
his behavior on and off the pitch led to unpopularity with fans, expulsion from the Soviet
League, and imprisonment in a labor camp. Upon his return to competition, Streltsov reinvented
his image to that of an accepted Soviet athlete.
Soccer fans, whose behavior Soviet officials wanted to influence by presenting idealized
Soviet sportsmen, were generally disciplined and loyal soccer fans. The world of a Soviet
spectator was small (especially outside of Moscow), limited to what was printed in the
newspapers, heard on the radio, or witnesses at a local game. When televised soccer was
introduced, fans could now engage with soccer clubs throughout the nation and throughout
Europe. This fractured the fans’ loyalties and exposed them to a soccer culture alien to their own.
Soviet officials had ambitious goals to make Soviet soccer something different than
soccer in the rest of the world; a sport that produced better citizens, not just better players.
Nevertheless, the need to produce skilled players and be competitive in international
competitions required changes to the traditional Soviet sportsmanship. From the late 1940s to the
end of the 1960s, the average soccer star changed from a tall, muscular Russian athlete to a
small, fast, and non-Russian. Fans’ exposure to provincial and international teams and players
only accelerated that transition. By the time traditional icons like Iashin and Streltsov retired,
Soviet soccer looked radically different. Soviet soccer power had shifted away from Moscow and
the next decade would be dominated by teams from Ukraine and the Caucasus, and the ethnicity
of soccer stars reflected this change. In general, Soviet soccer culture gradually transformed to
resemble leagues in Europe. After witnessing international hooligans riot and storm fields, a

58

young generation of Soviet fans created a new mode of fandom in the USSR. Players grew their
hair long and wore jerseys made by Adidas. Such change was certainly dramatic, but ultimately
improved the quality of Soviet soccer abroad and domestically.
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Chapter 2: The X’s and O’s of Communism: The Development of a Soviet Style of Play

In July 1960, the Soviet national team was in Marseille preparing to face Czechoslovakia
in the semifinals of the inaugural European Nations Cup. After an underwhelming performance
in the 1958 World Cup, the USSR added young, promising players to reinvigorate and energize
the team. The Soviet roster was talented, but unproven; only four players on the roster had
played more than twenty matches representing the USSR Furthermore, the team had not been
tested in the tournament. The Soviet Union easily advanced to the penultimate round via a 4-1
aggregate victory over Hungary and the withdrawal of Spain from the tournament, which gifted
the Soviet team a place in the final four. That easy path, however, ended in the next round;
Czechoslovakia was a skilled team capable of winning the entire tournament. The Czech team
was led by dynamic midfielder Josef Masopust, who would the Ballon D’or in 1962 and lead his
nation to a second-place finish at that year’s World Cup.
The starting eleven that took the field for the Soviet Union was a mix of young talent and
established stars. Viktor Ponedelnik, Mikhail Meshki, and Givi Chokheli (each only 23 years
old) debuted for the national team alongside Lev Iashin, Igor Netto, and Valentin Ivanov. The
result was a well-balanced squad that overwhelmed their Czechoslovakian opposition. The
USSR largely controlled the ball and pace of the game from kick-off and pressured the opposing
defense. In the 34th minute, the Soviets finally found the back of the net. Ponedelnik found space
at the top of the penalty box, wrong-footed his defender, and as the Czech goalkeeper rushed out
from his box, Ponedelnik effortlessly slid the ball to Ivanov for an easy tap-in.123
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Eleven minutes into the second half, the Soviet scored again. Ivanov pressed down the
right flank; Soviet midfielder Slava Metreveli expertly struck a pass that allowed Ivanov to get
behind the defense and face the goalkeeper one-on-one. As the keeper dove for the ball, Ivanov
quickly slid the ball underneath the goalkeeper’s extended arms before calmly shooting into the
wide-open goal.124 Only ten minutes later, Soviet midfielder Valentin Babukin advanced the ball
down the center of the pitch, Ponedelnik made an overlapping run on the left side, and Babukin
lifted a perfectly weighted pass over the defense. Ponedelnik settled the pass before blasting an
unstoppable shot passed the goalkeeper at close range to extend the Soviet lead to three goals.125
With twenty-five minutes remaining and leading by three goals, the Soviets controlled the rest of
the match and Czechoslovakia had not opportunity to mount a comeback.
The dominating win sent the Soviet Union to the final, where they defeated Yugoslavia
2-1 to secure the first European Nations Cup title. Though the championship match clearly
carried more significance, the semifinal win proved to be the best display of Soviet soccer.
During the game, the Soviet squad illustrated the core values of the Soviet style: Collective
teamwork, fitness, and discipline. Against Czechoslovakia, the Soviet team moved the ball
around the pitch quickly and efficiently. The eleven players performed as a single unit, often
swapping positions to create overloads in different areas of the field; the first and third goals
were scored via overlapping runs by Soviet forwards. Lastly, the Soviet players were better
conditioned than their opponents and the difference was especially clear in the second half of the
match as the Soviets outperformed the tiring Czech players.
The Soviet style was more than a tactical decision. Other styles of soccer than relied on
individual athleticism and skill had also been effective in international competition, but Soviet
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coaches and players chose to play the game in such a way that reflected their socialist society.
This meant Soviet clubs valued teamwork over individualism and interchangeable positions over
specialized roles. When effective, the Soviet style resulted in beautiful soccer and outstanding
goals like those scored against Czechoslovakia. Yet, as foreign teams developed new and
innovative tactics, Soviet coaches needed to evolve the Soviet style to remain competitive. The
effort to maintain Soviet values while also winning matches and tournaments became a major
theme during the Golden Age of Soviet Soccer.

Playing Catch-Up: A Tactical History of Soviet Soccer
Russia’s first entrance into international competition occurred before the Bolshevik
Revolution. In 1912, the Russian Empire sent a delegation of athletes to the Olympic Games in
Stockholm, including a soccer team. The roster was comprised of fifteen players from various
Saint Petersburg and Moscow clubs. By the luck of the draw, the team received a first-round bye,
then faced Finland in the second round. Finland beat Russia 2-1 in a close match, but in Russia’s
consolation match, they lost to Germany by a score of 16-0, an Olympic record.126 The
embarrassment of the soccer team, combined with a lack of success in other sports, led the
Russian press to label to 1912 Stockholm Olympics a “Sporting Tsushima,” referring to Russia’s
military disaster in the Russo-Japanese war.127
The eruption of World War One, followed by the Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil
War, derailed organized soccer. In the early 1920s, the Soviets established leagues based on
proximity, but a nationwide league did not exist until 1936. Furthermore, the Soviet Union did
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not join FIFA (Federation Internationale de Football Association), the sport’s global governing
organization. As a result, Soviet teams did not adhere to the standardized rules adopted by the
rest of the world.
Additionally, Soviet teams were not aware of the changes occurring in global soccer. In
1912, the Russian players were simply outplayed by their opposition; by the mid-1920s,
European teams had changed their style and formation while Soviet teams were largely playing
in the same fashion as a decade earlier. From the earliest years of soccer, teams fielded two
defenders, three midfielders, and five forwards (referred to as a 2-3-5). With the emphasis on
attacking players, the common strategy was to play a kick-and-chase style, sending the ball
upfield with hopes that one of the five forwards could gain possession and score. However, as
the game evolved, and players became more skilled, passing and dribbling grew more important.
Beginning in England in the early 1920s, a new formation emerged using three defenders, two
defensive midfielders, two advanced midfielders, and three forwards; this shape became known
as a W-M. The W-M allowed more passing options for midfielders, more defensive-minded
players, and emphasized passing and ball possession.
Soviet teams did not adopt the W-M; few were likely even aware of the formation.
However, since Soviet teams rarely engaged with foreign competition, their tactical
backwardness was not exposed. The isolation of and confidence in Soviet soccer fell apart in
1937. In order to raise awareness and money for the Basque cause in the Spanish Civil War, a
team of Basque all-stars toured the Soviet Union, playing several matches. Their roster featured
players who featured for Spain’s 1934 World Cup Team, and they employed the W-M. The
Basques soundly defeated many of their Soviet challengers, recording seven wins, one draw, and
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one loss, outscoring their opposition 32-17 in the process.128 Their single loss was to a Spartak
Moscow team which also featured several players from Dinamo Kiev. In addition to adding extra
players, Spartak also matched the Basque’s W-M and the extra defender stifled the foreigners’
offense.129 Spartak’s success displayed the necessity and benefits of adapting to the style of the
rest of Europe. Despite Spartak’s victory, the Basque tour was a wake-up call for Soviet soccer
officials. Pravda railed against the Soviet teams, writing “The performances of Basque Country
in the USSR showed that our best teams are far from high quality.”130 Yet, in a rare move for
Soviet journalism, the article provided a practical solution for the problem it presented: “It is
clear that improving the quality of the Soviet teams depends on directly on matches against
serious opponents.”131 After 1937, the W-M was gradually adopted by Soviet teams, but the
overall skill of Soviet players needed to improve to be competitive with the top European teams.

Dinamo Moscow’s Tour of the United Kingdom, 1945
Dinamo Moscow’s 1945 tour of the United Kingdom was the toughest test for a Soviet
soccer team. In terms of soccer, both teams were completely unknown to each other. Few British
fans, coaches, or players paid attention to the Soviet team. Likewise, though the Soviets knew
which clubs they would face, which British players they would play was another matter. World
War Two greatly disrupted the United Kingdom’s soccer leagues. Many British soccer players
fought in the war and in November 1945, some were still stationed abroad. Furthermore, players
who remained in Great Britain often played for multiple clubs. Therefore, while Dinamo knew
they would face Chelsea and Arsenal, it was not known which players those teams would be on
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the roster. Still, the Soviet players understood the style of their British opponents, regardless of
the players of the field. British teams rarely played soccer that relied on team cooperation, short
passing, and ball possession. Instead, English teams largely relied on the athleticism of
individual players, valuing strength and speed over skill. During this era, nearly all defensive
schemes relied on man-to-man marking. English teams certainly had skilled players, but often
they played on the wing where they could beat their defender one-on-one and dribble into open
space to either shoot or cross the ball towards goal.
Dinamo Moscow, on the other hand, played a completely different style of soccer.
Dinamo’s previous coach, Boris Arkadiev, had left the club before the 1945 season, but his
influence was evident in their tactics. Arkadiev’s goal as Dinamo’s manager was “to breath the
Russian soul into the English invention.”132 He achieved success by instituting a strategy that
allowed players freedom of movement on the field but kept an organized system. Players could
swap positions, dribble, or make runs outside of their normal zone, and defensive players could
attack when the opportunity presented itself. Yet, such freedom of movement was predicated on
the idea that when a player vacated his traditional zone, other players rotated to cover the empty
space. Therefore, while Arkadiev’s formation always remained a W-M, the players occupying
the positions were continually shifting. Many observers labelled Arkadiev’s style “organized
disorder.”133
Additionally, Arkadiev utilized a withdrawn center-forward. When opposing teams both
used W-M formations, the three attackers matched up with the three opposing defenders. The
center forward, instead of playing close to the central defender, retreated into the space between
the defenders and the first set of midfielders. This positioning presented three options for the
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defense, each presenting its own problems. First, if the defense remained in place, the forward
would not be pressured and have plenty of time and space to either take a shot at goal or find a
passing option. Secondly, if the central defender did follow the forward, then there was space
behind the defender where the outside forwards could make a run and receive a pass likely
resulting in a shot on goal. Lastly, if the outside defenders pinched together to negate the space
behind the central defender, this left the wing areas wide open for the outside forwards to cross
the ball into the penalty box or dribble towards goal. The withdrawn center-forward forced the
defense to react and created empty space in one of three areas of the field.

Diagram 1: The attacking options created via a withdrawn center-forward

The other key factor to Arkadiev’s tactics was ball possession. Instead of relying on long
passes and using a player’s speed, strength, and athleticism to regain possession, Dinamo utilized
shorter, safer passes to ensure ball retention. Additionally, when a player vacated his zone, he
created an overload in given area, meaning there were more attacking than defensive players and
passing was easier. Arkadiev’s system confused the defense through players switching positions,
whereas the British system relied on the offensive player to outrun or outmuscle to opposition.
When Arkadiev left Dinamo, Iakushin moved from player to manager, and continued the tactics
of his old coach. After the team had played in Britain, the spectators dubbed the style
“passovotchka.”134 The games between Dinamo and the English were a competition between

134

Wilson, Inverting the Pyramid, 82.

66

soccer ideologies; the individualistic, athletic, intimidating Britons versus the collective, skilled,
intelligent Soviets.
Ultimately, Dinamo played four games. Their opponents were Chelsea, Cardiff, Arsenal,
and Glasgow Rangers. Each team provided stiff competition, but Arsenal stood out as the
toughest challenge for Dinamo. A victory against Arsenal, regardless of the other three results,
would be a boost for Soviet soccer. Dinamo could not overlook their first opponent, though;
Chelsea was led by center-forward Tommy Lawton, a prototypical British striker. He was strong,
quick, and collected in front of goal. He had recently moved to Chelsea from Everton, where he
had scored in roughly two of every three games; an efficient ratio in any era of soccer.
Chelsea’s stadium overflowed with over 80,000 spectators struggling to watch the match,
but Dinamo at least acted as if the fervor surrounding the game didn’t affect them. When the
whistle blew, Dinamo instantly imposed their quick, intelligent style of play. Throughout the
early minutes of the game, Dinamo had more possession of the ball and created more scoring
chances. The constant movement of the Dinamo players and the center-forward’s withdrawn
position confused both Chelsea and the spectators. An English reporter noted, “It was impossible
to decide whether Kartsev [an attacking midfielder] or Beskov [the center-forward] was leading
the attack.”135 Despite Dinamo’s early dominance, Chelsea scored first on a mishandled shot
from Soviet goalkeeper Alexey Khomich. Later in the half, a miscommunication between
Khomich and a Dinamo defender resulted in a threatening situation. The defender rushed his
clearance, the ball deflected off a Chelsea player and into the net beyond Khomich’s outstretched
arms. Soon after, the first half ended and, though Dinamo had controlled the game, they were
down by two goals. Chelsea had the momentum as the second half began. Early on, a long shot
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from Lawton nearly added another goal, but hit the crossbar. Eventually, a Dinamo forward
dribbled past two defenders and “drove home an almost unstoppable shot from 30 yards.”136
Momentum had now swung towards Dinamo. Midway through the second half, Dinamo quickly
took a free kick, delivering the ball into a dangerous position. Through “quick passing and clever
positioning,” Dinamo forwards combined for a second goal for the Moscow club.137 The game
was tied, but not for long. Chelsea’s third goal came from Lawton outjumping the Dinamo
defense to head home a goal. Yet, with only a few minutes remaining, Bobrov scored an
equalizer from a deflected cross. The match ended in a 3-3 draw.

Diagram 2: Dinamo Moscow’s W-M, 1945

Though it had ended level, Dinamo were clearly the better team and their contrasting
style of play drew praise from the press and players. The London Times complemented Dinamo’s
“unquestioned ball control” and added “their counter-attacks were especially brilliant.”138
Chelsea defender Albert Tennant remarked, “The Russians were on the move all the time. We
could hardly keep up with them.”139 A reporter for Sporting Life echoed these observations,
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writing “The way they found and used open spaces is positively uncanny.”140 News Chronicle
reported summed up the British admiration best, writing “If Dynamo had won by a handsome
margin, they would have got no more than they deserved… It was not individually that the
Russians shone, but in teamwork.”141 Following the Chelsea match, Dinamo played Welsh club
Cardiff City, a much smaller and weaker squad than their previous opponents. Dinamo fielded an
identical lineup as before and, like the Chelsea game, controlled the flow of the first half. The
London Times wrote, “Cardiff could do nothing against a team who flashed weaved their way
through.”142 This time, however, Dinamo converted their early scoring chances, leading 3-0 at
halftime. The dominance of the Soviet only increased in the second half. At the final whistle,
Dinamo won by a score of 10-1.
The third game of the tour was the most important, for both the Soviets and the British.
After the impressive displays by Dinamo, the Arsenal manager had recruited a few players from
other English clubs to play for Arsenal in the exhibition match. The most notable was winger
Stanley Matthews of Stoke City, considered the best player in Britain. If Lawton symbolized the
physical nature of British soccer, then Matthews was the talisman of individualism. He was often
purposefully isolated and given space to beat defenders one-on-one. Former Arsenal player Alex
James saw Matthews as the key to victory. “There is no individualist in [Dinamo’s] side such as
a Matthews… This lack of an individualist is a great weakness.”143 Iakushin’s view of the British
winger was different, however. “His individual qualities are high, but we put collective football
first and individual football second… The principle of collective play is the guiding one in
Soviet football. A player must not only be good in general; he must be good for the particular
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team.”144 As against Chelsea, this game was competition between philosophies, both in terms of
soccer and society.
The game was played in fog, thick even by London standards. The London Times
remarked, “Exactly how all seven goals were scored was not clear. Any rapid movement on the
further side of the ground was ghostly and obscure.”145 The game was fast paced on both sides
but turned aggressive near the end of the first half. The Arsenal goalkeeper received a head
injury and the back-up replaced him to start the second half. The English players argued that
Matthews was being subjected to shirt-pulling, elbowing, and other violations. Khomich was
frequently roughed up even after making a save or securing the ball.146 Despite the physicality of
both sides, the game was full of goals and the final score favored Dinamo, 4-3. Reporters may
have not been able to see much through the fog, by the Soviet style of play continued to make an
impression. “What was clear was the Russian superiority in the collective ball-control – in other
words passing,” remarked the London Times, “and their amazing speed in midfield when a
sudden breakthrough was effected.”147 Matthews had played exceptionally (scoring two of
Arsenal’s three goals) but could not match Dinamo’s collective play. “Individually the Moscow
side had no player of the football stature of Matthews,” reported the London Times, “But
compared with their teamwork, that of Arsenal was painfully ragged and uncertain.”148
Dinamo finished the tour with a game against Glasgow Rangers. As usual, Dinamo
gained the early momentum and scored from a free kick after only two minutes. Twenty minutes
later, they added a second goal in which “all the forwards had taken part in the movement.”149
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Rangers got a goal back before halftime, and a late penalty for the Scottish team in the second
half leveled the match at 2-2, which would be the final score. The “organized disorder” of
Dinamo’s style made an impression on the Ranger players. One Glasgow defender later
observed, “They interchanged positions to the extent of the outside-left running over to the right
wing and vice versa. I have never seen football played like it.”150

Entering the International Arena, 1946-1952
The tour of Britain was a tremendous success for Dinamo Moscow and Soviet soccer.
Such dominating success against British teams elevated the status of Soviet soccer to an elite tier.
Yet, more importantly, Dinamo showed the world that the Soviet style of soccer was equal to, if
not superior than, the British method. The Daily Mail wrote that Dinamo played “a brand of
football which in class, style, and effectiveness is way ahead of our own.”151 While the
exhibitions games may have done little to fulfill its stated purpose of fostering friendship, it did
establish the credibility of Soviet soccer. Dinamo set an example to future Soviet teams, both in
terms of success and style. Their victories, as the Soviets saw, signaled the triumph not just of
Soviet soccer, but Soviet society as well.
From 1946 through 1951, Soviet teams engaged with numerous foreign squads to
continually prove their dominance. In 1946, the Soviet Union officially joined FIFA soccer’s
global governing body. Soviet teams played several foreign clubs, winning most matches. Yet,
like the competition Soviet teams faced in the 1920s and early 30s, none of their opponents were
quality competition. Soviet teams defeated opponents they should beat; there were no upset
victories like Dinamo recorded in England. Yet, Soviet observers were confident in their teams’
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inherent talent. One Soviet sports writer concluded, “The many victories of Soviet teams in
international competition demonstrated the advantages of our school over all others… Soviet
football serves the people… Our methods of study and training have a marked advantage over
methods used in capitalist countries.”152 Such a perspective of Soviet soccer, which was shared
by the state, set unrealistic expectation for Soviet teams. With no allowance for failure,
disappointment was inevitable.
The first post-war Olympics were held in 1948. The Soviet Union was absent from these
Olympics, which pleased both sides of the Iron Curtain. In the West, concerns of preserving
amateurism and sportsmanship prevented a full invitation for the Soviets. Though all Soviet
athletes were officially amateurs, Western observers viewed them as professionals. From the
Soviet viewpoint, the Olympics were a demonstration of bourgeoise culture. Additionally, the
Soviet Union would only enter the games if victory was certain, and the level of sport at the time
did not guarantee success. After another four years though, the Soviet state decided that it
benefited the USSR to join the Olympic movement. Victorious socialist athletes used the
Olympics as a tool to prove socialist superiority. In 1951, the USSR formed a National Olympic
Committee. The IOC included the USSR in the 1952 Helsinki Olympics.153
Arkadiev coached the soccer team that traveled to Helsinki and it was largely comprised
of players from his TsSKA club, though other stars such as Dinamo Moscow’s Konstantin
Beskov and Spartak Moscow’s Igor Netto were also key players. Between 1945 and 1951, they
had won five out of seven championships. TsSKA still played the W-M formation and employed
similar tactics to that of Dinamo seven years earlier. Iakushin, now coaching Dinamo Tbilisi,
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joined the team as an assistant coach. This squad was the first national soccer team for the Soviet
Union. Hopes were high for such a talented and experienced team; nothing less but a gold medal
would be satisfactory.
The USSR faced Bulgaria in the opening round of the tournament. In the 90 minutes of
regulation, neither team scored. Five minutes into extra-time, Bulgaria scored the first goal of the
game. Unable to score for the first 95 minutes, the Soviets only had 25 left to score or face
elimination. However, the fitness of Soviet players proved to be the deciding factor. Bobrov
scored in the 100th minute. Only four minutes later, Soviet midfielder Trofimov added another
and secure the win. The second-round match was against the much tougher Yugoslavia team.
Since the cessation of relations between Stalin and Tito, a Soviet team had not played a
Yugoslav squad since 1947. To further add to the mystery, no member of the Soviet soccer
contingent had watched Yugoslavia’s first round victory.154 As in the first-round game, the
Soviets struggled to score in the first half, but the Yugoslavs began the match well, dominating
control and taking a 4-0 lead into halftime. Seven minutes into the second half, Bobrov scored
the Soviet’s opener, but the Yugoslavs answered quickly, making it 5-1. Yugoslavia retreated to
a defensive formation to preserve the lead, but the strategy backfired and only invited pressure
from the Soviet attack. Trofimov scored with fifteen minutes remaining, then Bobrov added two
more goals. Finally, with only one minute left in regulation, the Soviets scored an equalizer. 30
minutes of extra time did not produce a winning goal, the match ended in a 5-5 tie, and the teams
played a rematch two days later.
The replay had a different feel than the first competition. Bobrov scored only six minutes
into the match to give the USSR an early lead. Yet, as the game progressed, the Soviets’ fitness
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and stamina, a trademark of Soviet soccer, failed them. Yugoslavia scored three unanswered
goals, knocking the Soviet Union out of the competition with no medal. The cause of the
Olympic collapse was primarily the result of Arkadiev and Iakushin’s mismanagement of
players, not necessarily because of tactical errors. The 1952 squad was an aging one. Beskov was
31, Bobrov was 30 (and had already undergone a major knee surgery), and Trofimov was 33.
The team had played three games over seven days with the first two going into extra-time. To
make matters worse, Arkadiev and Iakushin had fielded a nearly identical team in both games
against Yugoslavia. Naturally, the veteran players eventually lost their stamina and pace.
The loss was so unexpected and disgraceful, Sovetskii Sport did not print a column on the
game.155 The fallout for Soviet soccer and TsSKA was tremendous. Arkadiev, Iakushin, and
numerous players lost their “Master of Sport” titles.156 A few weeks after the Olympic debacle,
the 1952 Soviet League started with limited and unenthusiastic coverage by the press. After
several weeks, Sovetskii Sport finally published the league standings. TsSKA, the team from
which the Olympic squad drew most of its players, was absent from the table.157 The Soviet
Soccer Federation disbanded the club and its players distributed to other teams. It was only after
another two years, after Stalin’s death, that the club was reinstated.158

Gavriil Kachalin: Pragmatism on the Pitch, 1956-1960
Before the next Olympics, the national team needed to undergo a major restructuring.
Only three players from the Helsinki squad – Igor Netto, Anatolii Il’in, and Anatoli Bashashkin –
remained in 1956. The responsibility for winning fell on a young, upcoming generation of Soviet
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athletes. Instead of TsSKA, many players came from Spartak Moscow. Hopes and expectations
for victory rested on players such as Eduard Streltsov, Valentin Ivanov, Nikita Simonian, and
Lev Iashin. Gavriil Kachalin took over coaching responsibilities. He was a former player for
Dinamo Moscow during the tenure of Arkadiev and was even on the squad which suffered defeat
to the Basque team in 1937. Kachalin’s approach to soccer did not drastically differ from his
predecessor’s philosophy. Quick passing, movement away from the ball, and well-conditioned
players remained the focus, but multi-skilled players and their ability to swap positions was the
core of Kachalin’s strategy. He required forwards to drop back in defense, expected midfielders
to initiate attacked through the middle of the field, and even wanted goalkeepers to be involved
in moving the ball around the pitch.159 This approach suited the styles of Netto, Simonian, and
Iashin. Despite the failure in the previous Olympics, it was not the Soviet soccer philosophy that
was to blame, but the mismanagement and poor assembly of the team. Therefore, with a new
manager and many new players, the expectation was still victory.
In the opening match of the tournament, the USSR defeated Germany two goals to one.
The following match was against surprise qualifier Indonesia. They adopted and extremely
defensive approach, packed eight players into the defensive zone, and did not record a single
shot on goal; the games ended scoreless.160 In the replay, the Soviets won 4-0, and once again the
Indonesians played defensively, disrupting the Soviets’ passing based style. “Closely linked
movements proved ineffective with the final pass blocked or charged down,” reported the
London Times. “All for goals came either from dead ball movements or long-distance shots.”161
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Bulgaria awaited in the semi-finals. Similar to the match four years prior, extra time was
necessary after a scoreless 90 minutes. As if following the same script, Bulgaria scored first, but
the USSR answered with a goal from Streltsov. Four minutes before the end of the match,
Streltsov beat his defender down the touchline and crossed the ball in front of goal for an easy
strike for the forward Tatushin.162 The comeback victory set up a rematch against rival
Yugoslavia in the championship. The day of the final was rainy and the field became muddy,
slowing the speed of play, and hindering the Soviets’ passing style. The game was scoreless until
three minutes into the second half when three Spartak players – Tatushin, Anatoly Isaev, and
Anatolii Il’in – combined for a headed goal by the latter.163 The single goal was sufficient and
the Soviets won the gold medal. The victory had erased the embarrassment from four years ago.
Kachalin’s 1956 squad displayed the hallmarks of the Soviet style. Players weren’t bound to
specific positions and often created intricate passes to move the ball upfield and retain
possession. No one forward became the focus of the attack; seven different players had scored.
The players possessed better stamina and fitness than their opponents and typically controlled the
games in the final minutes. The young players performed impressively. Iashin conceded only
two goals in five games. Streltsov enthralled fans as well, displaying dribbling and passing skills
on the wing; scoring twice and assisting the game winner against Bulgaria.
The new generation surpassed expectations, and only improved with time and experience.
Now that the national team had been successful in an international tournament, it was time for
the Soviet Union to test itself in the ultimate international competition: The World Cup. As
reigning Olympic champions, the Soviet squad retained many of the same players from
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Melbourne. Lev Iashin was in goal, Igor Netto in midfield, and Anatolii Il’in, Valentin Ivanov
and Nikita Simonian as forwards. Notably absent from the squad was rising star Eduard
Streltsov. Only weeks before the World Cup, he had been arrested for rape. Though he was not
sentenced until after the tournament, he still lost his place in the squad.164 The loss of one player,
however, did not dampen expectations for victory. After all, success was the result of collective,
team play not individuals. The USSR opened the tournament against perennial power England.
The Soviets opened the scoring early. Il’in dribbled into the penalty box, fired a shot on goal that
the England goalkeeper should have caught. Instead, he merely deflected the ball to the side and
Simonian was in position to score on the rebound. The Soviets’ first ever World Cup goal was
the result of a mishandled shot, but citing the teamwork before the goal, they saw it as the
outcome of their collective style. Reflecting on the goal, Simonian stated, “The goal was the
result of the team’s effort. It was a team goal… I scored because my teammates created the
opportunity for me. The goal was as much about them as it was about me scoring it.”165
The Soviets added a second goal after halftime. Defender Vladimir Kesarev dribbled
through the center of midfield and played an accurate pass to Ivanov. The England goalkeeper
charged the Soviet forward, but Ivanov beautifully dodged him and scored on the empty net.166
However, England came roaring back. In the 66th minute, from a free kick, England lobbed a ball
into the center of the penalty area. The ball bounced, untouched, near the penalty spot. Iashin
initially charged as if he planned to punch the ball out of the box, but hesitated and retreated to
the goal line. An England forward headed the ball into goal while Iashin was out of position.
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With five minutes left in regulation, the English earned a penalty kick. Iashin was unable to
block it, and the game ended 2-2.167

Diagram 3: Kachalin’s W-M, 1956-1960

Against Austria in the second match, the Soviets began the game with their usual fast
paced passing. Sovetskii Sport wrote, “Our players offered a quick tempo, especially when the
attacks were conducted down the right wing.”168 Il’in, the right-wing, opened the scoring in the
15th minute on a cross from Ivanov. The momentum appeared to be in favor of the Soviets, but
the Austrians had the opportunity to level the score on another penalty shot. Iashin, who was in
excellent form all game, saved the shot and kept the shutout. Ultimately, the USSR secured at 20 victory after Ivanov added another goal, but as Sovetskii Sport reported, it was a “victory,
earned with difficulty.”169 The final match of the group stage against Brazil was the toughest test.
Already a talented squad, Brazil added two more attacking stars, Pele and Garrincha, who missed
the first two matches due to minor injuries. From the opening kickoff, Brazil immediately
isolated Garrincha on the wing. A Soviet defender closed him down, Garrincha faked left, went
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right, and left the defender on the ground. He then cut inside and fired a shot that bounced off the
post. In the next minute, Pele also had a clear shot denied by the post, and in the third minute
Brazil finally scored. Renowned French journalist Gabriel Hanot remarked that it was the
greatest three minutes of soccer ever played.170 The game ended 2-0 in favor of Brazil, but it
could have easily been more.
The loss forced the USSR to play a tiebreaker against England. Iashin played well and
recorded another shutout while Voynov and Il’in recorded the only goal on a “lighting fast
combination,” typical of the Soviet style.171 The tiebreaker victory set up a quarterfinal match
against host nation, Sweden. The squad was still fatigued from the extra match. Kachalin
understood the challenge before the team; a victory against the host team in the capital city was
not an easy result. Before the game, Kachalin advised his players that a slight victory was all he
could expect from them. Then a member of the accompanying party delegation interrupted,
remined the team of Russia’s victory over the Swedes at the Battle of Poltava, and ordered the
team to destroy their opponents.172 An earlier rain had left the field muddy, hindering the
Soviets’ quick passing style. Instead, the Swedish team controlled possession, forcing the Soviets
to utilize “rare, but fast counterattacks.”173 However, the Soviet attackers could not combine for
a goal. With the support of the home crowd, Sweden scored twice in the second half, eliminating
the Soviet Union.
In relative terms, a quarterfinal appearance in a first World Cup is a respectable
achievement, but it was a disappointment for the Soviet Union. As in 1952, the coach accepted
the blame. Kachalin stated that he had not trained the team hard enough leading up to the
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tournament, and as a result, the sharpness of their skill and their endurance had suffered.174 The
1958 World Cup was a missed opportunity for Soviet soccer, and not strictly of their own doing.
The squad was without playmaking forward Eduard Streltsov, and Igor Netto, though included
on the team, did not play the entire tournament due to an injury. Iashin picked up an injury in the
opening match that hampered him throughout the tournament. Reflecting on the tournament
years later, Andrei Starostin, who helped compiled the roster, wrote “Imagine what it would have
been like with our national team in Stockholm if Iashin had led the defense, Netto our midfield
and Streltsov our attack.”175
Despite the dissatisfaction, Kachalin remained in charge of the national team. The
national team made another tournament debut in the European Nations Cup, organized by the
Union of European Football Associations (UEFA). The 1960 UEFA European Nations Cup was
the first installment of the tournament, and many prominent nations such as England, the
Netherlands, and West Germany decided not to compete. The structure of each round was such
that each team played home and away, with the winner determined by aggregate goals scored.
The USSR advanced to the second qualifying round, drawn to play Spain. Alfredo di Stefano led
the team and he had just won the UEFA Champions Cup (a European competition for domestic
clubs) with Real Madrid. The matchup never occurred, though. The Spanish government
declined to travel to the Soviet Union on political ground, thereby forfeiting both games and
gifting the Soviets a spot in the semifinals.176
The semifinal matches were single-elimination and hosted in France. The Soviets
defeated Czechoslovakia 3-0, with goal by Ivanov and two by new forward Viktor Ponedelnik.
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In the championship match, they faced their political, and now soccer rival, Yugoslavia.
Additionally, they contended with another obstacle that had hindered them before; a muddy,
sloppy field. In the first half, neither team could gain much momentum. It was not until two
minutes before the break that a Yugoslav forward beat Iashin to opening the scoring. Coming out
of halftime, the Soviets responded by equalizing. The opposing keeper pushed away a powerful
strike by midfielder Valentin Babukin, only to have Slava Metreveli dash in from the wing and
tap in the rebound. Momentum oscillated for the rest of the match, but neither squad could find
winning goal; Iashin was in excellent form. In extra time, he continued to be hero for the
Soviets. An especially acrobat dive stopped the ball at the goal line, denying the Yugoslavs a
sure winner. Sports newspaper Futbol i Khokkei highlighted this save as the moment of the
match.177 Seven minutes later, Ivanov received the ball on the wing and crossed into the penalty
box. Ponedelnik elevated above the defense and headed the ball into the top corner.178 The Soviet
Union won the inaugural European Nations Cup.
Soviet commentators partly attributed the success to their superior tactics and style of
play, “Our team played the game in the usual way,” wrote manager Kachalin. “[The team]
carried out their defense and attacked with a wide front, using the flanks.”179 But more than the
tactics, it was the make-up of the Soviet players, what Arkadiev had earlier called the “high
moral and physical character,” that brought victory. Kachalin wrote, “The team, from the first
minutes through the second half were strong because of their solidarity, variety of technical and
tactical skills, and physical preparation… It is the totality of these qualities that allowed the
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athletes in red shirts with the letters ‘USSR’ on their chest to win an honorable and deserved
victory.”180

Tactical Innovation Abroad and at Home, 1960-1962
The beginning of the 1960s marked a turning point for Soviet soccer. The championship
had placed the USSR to the status of the elite team in Europe. Yet, it was also a period of tactical
transition for both Soviet and global soccer tactics. In the 1958 World Cup, Brazil won the
championship while playing an attractive and dominating style. Granted, their squad consisted of
rising superstars and experienced veterans like Pele, Garrincha, Vava, and Didi, but they also
displayed a new formation and tactical approach as well.
Brazil had moved away from the W-M formation. Instead they deployed a 4-2-4. It was
not an entirely new formation: The Hungarian team of the early 50s had used a four-man
defensive line, but it was how the Brazilians utilized the formation to emphasize their players’
abilities that made the difference. First, instead of man-to-man marking on defense, the defenders
used zonal marking. This allowed Brazilian defenders more freedom to attack, especially along
the sidelines. Secondly, similar to the withdrawn center forward utilized by Arkadiev in England,
the Brazilians staggered the two midfielders and one of the forwards. This forced defenders to
move out of position and provided multiple passing options in the midfield area. The Brazilian
stars were masters of improvisation and individual talent. What the Brazilian 4-2-4 created was
an efficient system that allowed for improvisation and attacking play, but did not leave the
defense vulnerable.181
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At first glance, the Brazilian system might seem compatible with the Soviet style of play;
both emphasized fast, attacking play. However, Brazil’s style was actually mismatched with
Soviet soccer philosophy. Essentially, Brazil divided their team in two an offensive group and
defensive group which operated largely independent of each other. Kachalin recognized this
limitations of the Brazilian system, writing “We are not against the 1-4-2-4…but we are against
increasing the defenders through special, constant lines and using them only in defense.”182
Secondly, when attacking, Brazil relied on the individual skill and creativity of their stars. This is
not to say Brazil did not use quick passes to break down defenses, but they were willing to let
their players isolate themselves on the wing and attack defenders one-on-one. Still, the success
and popularity of Brazil and their new system forced Soviet coaches to adapt elements into the
Soviet style of play.

Diagram 4: The Brazilian 4-2-4

The other turning point in Soviet soccer occurred domestically. Since the inception of the
Soviet top league, only three different clubs had won the championship: Dinamo Moscow,
Spartak, and TsDKA. In 1960, Torpedo Moscow claimed the title. In 1961, Dinamo Kyiv
finished in first place. Dinamo Moscow, Spartak, and TsDKA remained competitive clubs, but
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their monopoly on Soviet soccer disappeared. One of the primary innovators in Soviet soccer
was Torpedo coach Viktor Maslov. He coached them to the championship in 1960, and later won
three titles at the helm of Dinamo Kyiv. Maslov was a mild-mannered coach, whose soft
approach with players and sage-like knowledge of soccer earned him the nickname “Grandad.”
Following the traditional Soviet school of soccer, he emphasized collective play. The tactical
system was more important than any one player, no matter how talented. Maslov removed the
Ukrainian winger Valeriy Lobanovskyi, who had starred for Dinamo Kyiv for seven seasons,
after one year because his style did not match the tactics. Maslov’s approach to the collective
even extended into the locker room. All members of the team engaged in tactical discussions and
Maslov was willing to compromise and trust his players.183

Diagram 5: Maslov’s 4-4-2

Maslov had adopted a four-man defense like Brazil. However, Maslov was not fond of
wing players, fearing they spent too much time dribbling instead of passing and moving the ball
up the field. Speed was a key element of Maslov’s teams.184 Therefore, instead of using a 4-2-4,
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he dropped both of his wings further back, thus creating a 4-4-2. “Football is like an aeroplane”
he said, explaining his different formation. “As velocities increase, you have to make the head
more streamlined.”185 The two midfielders also staggered themselves, even to the point of one
being directly in front of the other. In a way, Maslov’s formation could even be called a 4-1-3-2.
Like Brazil, Maslov used zonal marking which allowed for defenders the ability to move forward
and attack, knowing their teammates were covering their position.
A major rule in soccer is offsides, which prohibits an attacking player from being behind
the last defender when the ball passed to said player. This excludes players from remaining near
the goal and waiting for a long pass to create a scoring chance. Instead, a forward must begin in
front of the defense when the ball is passed and then beat the defender to the ball; this play was
known as a “through-pass.” Maslov used the offsides rule to compress to field of play. His
defensive line moved as a unit and therefore negated opposing players caught behind the
defenders in an offside position. In essence, he developed the tactic of “pressing,” which many
coaches still use in modern soccer. The movement of the defensive line made the playing field
smaller, allowing the midfielders to put more pressure on whomever possessed the ball. Maslov
allowed the threat of a through-pass, but relied on his midfielders to apply enough pressure on
the opposition that such a long pass was difficult to execute. Pressing inherently relied on
collective play. If a defender did not stay level with the rest of the defensive line, an opposing
player could easily remain onside. Similarly, if the midfielders did not adequately press the ball,
a long pass was easier to play. Nearly all eleven players on the field had defensive
responsibilities. By the end of 1960, the W-M was going extinct both in the Soviet Union and in
the rest of the world. Kachalin clearly saw this tactical change coming. “It is not a mistake to
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say that last season [1959-1960] for the first time ever in the history of Russian football our
teams played differently.”186 The national team was already preparing for the 1962 World Cup in
Chile. Kachalin needed to decide: Would he stick with the formation that had won the European
championship or adopt the new 4-2-4 formation? And if he did adopt the new formation, how
could he impose the principles of Soviet soccer onto the Western development? Kachalin liked
by Maslov’s tactics at Torpedo, especially the way he kept collective play at the core of his
strategy. “The success of the Torpedo Moscow was not an accident… They pleased fans of
football and professionals with a smooth, strong game that characterizes them as a high-class
team… This is a well-played ensemble, where each ‘violin’ sounds in unison with all the rest.”187
Therefore, heading into the 1962 World Cup, Kachalin was now fielding at 4-2-4, adapting
elements of Maslov’s Torpedo and the Brazilian national team. The defensive line did not push
as high as Torpedo’s, but still compressed the field to apply defensive pressure. Unlike Maslov,
however, Kachalin valued wing play. Thus, the outside wings did not drop back, but played
almost even with the two center-forwards, similar to the Brazilian style. The two midfielders
played staggered; Kachalin usually reassigned a traditional winger to the advanced midfield
position to add extra speed in attack, while Igor Netto played deeper an acted as a pivot to move
the ball around the field. Netto was the key player in this system, as it was his responsibility to
distribute the ball and begin attacks.
The new role fit Netto’s style perfectly. Since 1956, Netto served as captain of the
national team. Off the field, he was demanding and critical of his teammates. “Netto said
everything to everyone eye-to-eye,” recalled Simonian, “although the captain’s character was not
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pleasing to everyone, they understood he was fair.” 188 On the field, Netto was the engine of the
team. His controlled the tempo of the game through short, accurate passes. “He did not risk long
passes,” Simonian remembered, “His passes were short or medium. He played surely.”189 In the
new 4-2-4 formation, Netto played in the center of the pitch with passing options in every
direction, allowing the Soviet team to move the ball across the pitch quickly and efficiently.

Diagram 6: Kachalin’s 4-2-4 at the 1962 World Cup

Excitement and high expectations surrounded the Soviet team, as usual, but this time it
was warranted. The USSR traveled to Chile as champions of Europe, and hoped they left as
champions of the world. They played in a group with Yugoslavia, Uruguay, and Colombia; a
tricky group, but one from which to Soviets should advance. All seemed well after the first
game. They dispatched their traditional rival, Yugoslavia, 2-0. The next match was against
Colombia, the weakest of the teams. It was a quick start for the USSR. By the 11th minute, they
had jumped out to a 3-0 lead. Perhaps anticipating another easy victory, the Soviets let they
guard down. Though they led 4-1 with less than 25 minutes remaining, the Colombians scored
three unanswered goals to force a draw. French soccer magazine L’Equipe called it “one of the
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greatest surprises of modern football.”190 The tie now required the Soviets to defeat Uruguay to
advance out of their group. In the 38th minute, the USSR opened to scoring, but the Uruguayans
equalized soon after halftime. It was 1-1 until the 89th minute when Ivanov scored a dramatic
winner to send the Soviets through to the quarterfinals. There, they’d meet Chile. The game was
an oscillating battle early on. Backed by a strong crowd. Chile scored on a swerving free kick,
but the Soviet forward Chislenko quickly leveled the score. Before either team could catch their
breath, the Chileans scored from a long-distance strike that flew into the bottom corner of the
goal.191 Chile was also playing a 4-2-4, but after gaining the lead, they dropped forward deeper
to play a 4-3-3, stifling the USSR’s attack.192 The game ended 2-1 in favor of Chile.
The performance in 1962 was eerily similar to that of four years earlier. The Soviets had
won their group stage, but lost in the quarterfinals to the host nation. It was another
embarrassment at the World Cup. Much of the blame for the loss fell to Iashin. Out of any
player, it was the goalkeeper who had the highest expectations placed on him. Also, given the
individualistic nature of the position, it was easier to single out a mistake by the goalkeeper than
another player. The Colombia match saw Iashin surrender four goals, the second of which the
opposition scored directly from a corner kick. Chile scored their opening goal from 25 yards out,
and even neutral reporters questioned Iashin’s handling of the shot. “For all [the kick’s]
formidable power,” wrote an English reporter, “how such a long shot beat a goalkeeper as great
as Yachine [sic] remains a mystery.”193
While the Colombian corner kick was the example of Iashin’s bad play, it was not
entirely his fault. The team’s defensive approach to the corner kick had Iashin position further
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back on the goal-line while a defender stood at the near post; the strategy was the defender
forced the kick to go over him and give Iashin or another defender the chance the clear the ball.
However, the Colombian kick went low and directly to the near post. The defender had moved
away from the goal and allowed the ball to sneak in between him and the post. After the goal, the
defender was obviously aware of his blunder, hanging his head as Iashin berated him.194 Against
Chile, the initial goal was from a free kick inches outside the penalty box, but at tight angle.
While Iashin’s positioning might have been better (the shot beat him on the near side), a Soviet
defender was responsible for fouling the opponent and giving a free kick close to goal. The runup to the second Chilean goal began from a carless giveaway by a Soviet midfielder. Then the
defense afforded the goal scorer plenty of space to take a powerful shot.195 Once again, Iashin’s
positioning could be questioned, but the goals should not have been entirely blamed on him.
Ultimately, the 1962 World Cup showed that if success comes from collective play, then failures
also should rest on the entire team.

Konstantin Beskov and the 1964 European Nations Cup
Kachalin was the longest tenured and most successful coach of the national team, yet the
Soviet Football Federation decided to remove him as manager. The tone of Soviet soccer was
beginning to shift. The emphasis on collective teamwork did not vanish, but the USSR realized
the need for individually skilled players that could take “risk and responsibility” on themselves
in critical games.196 In his place, the union installed Konstantin Beskov, the former Dinamo
player who led their attack in England. Since he retired from playing in 1954, he had brief stints
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as coach of Torpedo Moscow and TsDKA. As one might expect, because of Beskov’s past
playing experience as a striker, he tactics emphasized attacking soccer. “I’m a supporter of the
attacking school of football,” he wrote while coaching TsDKA. “Football consists of beautiful
attacks and beautiful defenses.”197

Diagram 7: Beskov’s 4-2-4 at 1964 European Nations Cup

Looking to add the individualist flair that the Soviet Union was presumably lacking,
Beskov’s squad was more directly based on Brazilian tactics. He had used a 4-2-4 formation, but
encouraged the wings to advance quickly and find space to use their individual skill. He strived
for a system that retained the passing, collective style of past Soviet teams, but allowed moments
of individual talent to be the catalyst for attacks. “[Tactics] determine the content of the game,
which consists of numerous co-operations, maneuvers, feints, and precise transfers.”198
Commenting on the USSR’s success in qualifying matches, a Soviet journalist commented on
Beskov’s style of play. “If Beskov did not blindly copy the Brazilian system, it only shows that
he correctly understood it and uses its principles.”199
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Spain hosted the finals of the European Nations Cup. In the semi-final match, the Soviets
comfortably dispatched Denmark 3-0 with goals by Ivanov, Ponedelnik and new midfielder
Valeriy Voronin. In the championship, the USSR faced host nation Spain. Since they were
hosting, Spain had to play against the Soviets; forfeiting a championship match in a home
stadium would have been the pinnacle of humiliation. Midfielder Luis Suarez led the Spanish
squad; he had won the UEFA Champions Cup with Inter Milan earlier that year. With Francisco
Franco in attendance, the Spaniards controlled the ball early. They played long passes into
dangerous area, forcing Iashin to come out of goal and clear the ball. In the 6th minute, Suarez
won possession in the Soviets’ half. He darted down the right flank and crossed the ball. Soviet
defender Viktor Shustikov mistimed his leap and the ball fell to a Spanish attacker who easily
scored against a helpless Iashin. The Soviets responded quickly, however. Iashin collected the
ball in the penalty area, then threw and outlet pass to an outside defender who had moved up the
left side of the field. Soviet winger Galimzian Khusainov then split the Spanish defense with a
precise run and the defender delivered an accurate long pass, setting up Khusainov for an easy
equalizer. The game remained 1-1 for the majority of the game. Occasionally, the USSR
mounted an attack down the wings, but Suarez and the Spanish midfield controlled possession
for most of the game. Extra-time seemed imminent, but with only six minutes remaining, the
Spanish squad scored on an improbable diving header. Once again, Shustikov failed to clear a
Spanish pass into the penalty area. This provided space for the opponent to dive forward and
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head the ball pass a surprised Iashin. The Soviets furiously attacked in the final five minutes, but
could not level the score.200
On a tactical level, the loss to Spain was not an embarrassment. The key factor was the
midfield. Spain still used a W-M formation, and deployed four midfielders compared to the two
midfielders in the Soviet formation. Both Soviet midfielders were talented, but young and
inexperienced. Containing Suarez and the three other Spanish midfielders was too much to ask.
However, on a political level, a defeat to fascist Spain was a catastrophe. If soccer players and
their quality of play were representative of the society and culture from which they emerged,
then the championship had proven that fascism was superior to socialism. Such a result was
unacceptable. Despite a successful tenure, the Soviet Football Federation relieved Beskov as
manager after only 18 months.

Nikolai Morozov and “Catenaccio”
Nikolai Morozov took charge of the national team. He, like many other Soviet managers,
bounced from team to team and most recently had coached Torpedo Moscow in the 1963
campaign. He too employed a 4-2-4 formation, but the tactics and style of play he implemented
were different than that of Beskov and the Brazilian team. Instead, he modeled his strategy on
Argentine coach Helenio Herrera, coach of Inter Milan who had won the UEFA European Cup in
1964 and 1965. Herrera’s system was a much more defensive approach. He nicknamed the style
Catenaccio, named for the bolt on a door lock. Its main feature was using a defender to drop
behind the defensive line to act as a sweeper, roaming in front of the goalkeeper to intercept any
long passes. Additionally, Herrera had the wings drop in defensive support and relied on a
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central midfielder to create counter attacks. For Morozov, central defender Albert Shesternyov
acted as the sweeper and Voronin initiated the attack. The Soviets played in a group with
surprise qualifier North Korea, Chile, and Italy. In the group stage, Morozov’s defensive style
prospered, and the attack was efficient. In three games, the Soviets outscored their opponents 61. The quarterfinal match, where previous national teams had faltered, saw the USSR play
Hungary, who had eliminated defending champions Brazil in their group match. Only five
minutes in, the Hungarian keeper fumbled a weak shot and Igor Chislenko tapped home the
opening goal for the Soviets. USSR forward Valeriyi Porkuian added another in the first minute
of the second half to extended the lead. Hungary added a goal of their own on a quick counter
attack, but the Soviets controlled the game and secured a 2-1 victory, advancing to the
semifinals.201 Advancing beyond the quarterfinals was a milestone for the national team and a
vindication of the new, tactical approach of Soviet soccer. “The fact that our players achieved
success precisely at a time when tactics are changing,” wrote Sovetskii Sport, “means that our
football is on a progressive path.”202

Diagram 8: Morozov’s “Catenaccio” 4-2-4
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West Germany awaited in the semifinal. It was a match defined by sloppy and aggressive
play. Early in the game, midfielder Iozhef Sabo injured himself attempting a tackle and Igor
Chislenko earned a red card, causing his ejection from the game.203 With the USSR down a man,
the Germans ultimately wore down Morozov’s defense, inflicting a 2-1 defeat on the Soviets. In
the consolation game, the Soviets faced Portugal and star forward Eusebio. After a handball in
the penalty area called against the Soviets, Eusebio struck an unstoppable penalty kick. The
USSR equalized just before halftime, but with only one minute remaining in regulation, the
Portuguese found a winning goal even though the Soviets had controlled possession most of the
half.204 Though they had lost their last two games, the USSR placed fourth, its best World Cup
result. “Undoubtedly, this should be considered a success,” wrote Futbol i Khokkei, summing up
the result.205

Conclusion
A fourth-place finish at the 1966 World Cup was the pinnacle of national team success.
After the tournament, the national team slowly lost its prestige until slipping into obscurity for
most of the 1970s and ‘80s. The generation that was the source of much of the success in the
1950s and ‘60s – Igor Netto, Valentin Ivanov, Viktor Ponedelnik, Lev Iashin – had retired from
international soccer. The Soviet Football Federation unexpectedly removed Nikolai Morozov as
manager and a string of briefly tenured coaches followed. Mikhail Iakushin led the team to the
1968 European Nations cup, finishing fourth after an embarrassing loss to England. Kachalin
returned to coach in the 1970 World Cup, but the national team resumed the practice of only
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reaching the quarterfinal before faltering. The last gasp of the national team was an improbable
run in the 1972 European Nations cup when the new generation of players reached the finals
before losing 3-0 to a West Germany squad that would win the World Cup two years later. After
1972, the USSR failed to qualify for three consecutive European Nations Cups and two straight
World Cups.
The legacy of the Soviet national teams of the 1950s and 1960s is mixed. Many nations
would be envious of an Olympic gold medal, a European Nations Cup championship, and
multiple appearances in the knock-out stage of the World Cup. However, for the Soviet Union,
inconsistent results were not acceptable, especially compared to the success of Soviet athletes in
the Olympic games and ice hockey. The Soviet state expected soccer to achieve the same results
as these other sports. What was the reason behind the inconsistent results of Soviet soccer?
The most apparent reason for the disparity in results between Soviet sports is the level of
competition faced. In ice hockey, for example, the USSR’s main competitors were only Canada,
Scandinavia, and Eastern European nations. In soccer, however, the Soviet Union had to
compete with all of Europe, Latin America, and even Asian countries. Additionally, in large part,
Soviet ice hockey teams and Olympians competed against other officially amateur athletes. The
World Cup and European Nations Cup are open to professional soccer players, and therefore
Soviet players did not possess the same advantage.
From the perspective of the Soviet press, the failures of the national team could always be
attributed to individuals or single events that cost the team victory. In 1952, Arkadiev
overworked the veteran players, and in 1958 Kachalin had not trained the team enough. In 1962,
it was Iashin’s goalkeeping mistakes that eliminated the team. Beskov’s loss to fascist Spain,
whatever the reason, was intolerable and required his removal. What was rarely at fault, if ever,
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was the tactics employed by the team. The Soviet style of soccer, which proved itself superior by
Dinamo’s 1945 tour of England, had evolved throughout the 1950s and 1960s, but its core
principles remained: Frequent passing, lack of individualism, involvement of entire team in
offense or defense, and superior fitness.
These principles, more than any one person, were responsible for the championships in
1956 and 1960. However, the Soviet style had to adapt to changes in global soccer. No more
were Soviet tactics to be isolated and only developed within the USSR. The success of Brazil
and Inter Milan had radically changed the mindset of Soviet coaches. After all, the purpose of
international competition was to prove the superiority of Soviet society. Therefore, tactical
adjustments were necessary in order to remain successful. Not to discount the developments of
Arkadiev and Iakushin, but Kachalin, Beskov, and Morozov displayed a flexible ideology (if
only an ideology of soccer) uncommon in the culture, especially considering they personally
represented the USSR on an international stage. Yet, one should not assume that every tactical
change had political or idealistic undertones. These players and coaches were intense
competitors. When the game started, the goal was to win. Not necessarily for the Soviet Union or
for socialist ideology, but for themselves. Ultimately, the success of the national team does not
belong to their culture, politics, or society; it belongs to the men who played the game.
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Chapter 3: Politics on the Pitch: Soccer and Soviet Foreign Policy
Introduction
The final match of Dinamo’s 1945 tour of the United Kingdom took place in Glasgow
against the top Scottish team of the era, Rangers. Dinamo had already taken Great Britain by
storm, tying Chelsea 3-3, thrashing Cardiff City 10-1, and defeating Arsenal 4-3. For most of the
British public, Dinamo versus Arsenal was the true highlight of the tour and the game against
Rangers was more of an encore for the visiting Soviets rather than a competitive finale to the
tour. Still, in Glasgow, Scottish fans and Rangers took the game seriously and expected to defeat
Dinamo. As chance had it, Dinamo had nearly a week off before playing Rangers. Naturally, the
Soviets used the extra tie to train and scout their opponents, but there was also plenty of time to
tour Glasgow and enjoy the hospitality of their Scottish hosts.
Throughout the tour, the English Soccer Association and the hosting clubs made an extra
effort to welcome their guests. After all, the English Soccer Association had invited Dinamo in
order to increase cooperation and friendship between the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union.
A warm and accepting environment surrounded each match. Against Chelsea, Dinamo players
received flowers before the match, some fans waved the Soviet flag in the crowd, and even a
portrait of Joseph Stalin adorned one of the grandstands.206 Not to be outdone, Cardiff City
presented the Dinamo squad with miners’ lamps in a pre-match ceremony.207
Scottish soccer fans, though, took the greatest efforts to welcome their Soviet guests. The
Soviet flag flew alongside St. Andrew’s Cross atop of the stadium where the match was to be
played. Additionally, the Glaswegian press, either in true admiration of Dinamo or merely
writing overly-kind words about them, praised the Soviets’ performance and success while on
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tour. “It was a first-rate idea,” wrote the Glasgow Evening News, “to send [the Soviet Union’s]
famous football team, the Dynamos to Britain.” In a similar fashion to Soviet soccer fans, the
article linked Dinamo’s performance to their culture. “The Russian people have reminded us that
impressive virile achievement of a manifold sort may and should be accompanied by communal
respect for intellect and art. Therein lies their true greatness.”208 With the Cold War looming
over both nations, the article suggested that art and culture, sports included, could be a source of
understanding and form of cooperation, stating “A people who love football and can produce a
team like the Dynamos cannot be so very different from ourselves… It may be that the biggest
victory in history – the victory over mutual understanding and suspicion – will have been won
the football fields of Britain.”209 In concluding the column, the journalist proclaimed that soccer
served “a great world purpose by promoting human understanding between peoples.”210
However, the match itself did not reflect such understanding or friendship. From the start
of the match, Rangers displayed their typically British style of aggressive, hard-tackling soccer.
This approach hurt them early, though, as Dinamo scored directly from a free-kick to opening
the scoring. Yet, Rangers remained aggressive on both offense and defense, and eventually their
violent style threw Dinamo off their game. By the end of the first half, Soviet players had
resorted to holding, shirt-pulling, and body-checks. The referee awarded penalty-kicks to
Rangers on three separate occasions, though they only converted one chance. The game finally
ended in 2-2 draw, but even after the match, accusations of cheating and ill-will continued. The
Soviets accused the referee of ignoring fouls on their goalkeeper while awarding dubious
penalties for the home team. Rangers, on the other hand, suspected that midway through the
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second half, Dinamo snuck a twelfth player onto the field.211 While Dinamo had no more
officially scheduled matches remaining, two days after the match in Glasgow, both English and
Soviet soccer officials decided that Dinamo would not play any more games and return to the
Soviet Union.212 What some had hoped would promote friendship and mutual understanding
only resulted in bitterness and mistrust.
As the Cold War intensified, the political nature of soccer did so as well. The Soviet
Union occupied a new role in the world after the war, one that required interaction with enemies
and allies alike. This need for engagement extended to soccer as well. Exhibition matches against
teams from Soviet allies promoted cooperation, while competitive games and participation in
international tournaments sought to display strength of Soviet sport. Yet, as the match against
Glasgow Rangers showed, intentions do not always reflect reality. At times, matches against
communist allies resulted in antagonism on and off the field. Moreover, Soviet teams struggled
to consistently win games against communist opponents. During the 1950s and 1960s, soccer
reflected the complex issues of Soviet foreign policy, such as maintaining order in Eastern
Europe, attracting support from non-aligned nations, and proving communist superiority over
Cold War enemies.

Soccer and Soviet Foreign Policy
In the first decades of the Soviet Union, sport played little importance in foreign affairs.
Following the Bolshevik Revolution, as the USSR sought to spread communism throughout the
rest of the world, Soviet officials rejected participation in Western, bourgeois sporting
competitions, such as the Olympics and the World Cup; the Soviet Union even refused to
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affiliate with those competitions’ organizing bodies, the International Olympic Committee (IOC)
and FIFA, respectively. Instead of international competition against bourgeois organizations,
Soviet sport authorities were more concerned with creating an athletic, proletarian culture that
encouraged healthy living. Therefore, the Soviet Union created parallel organizations to replace
and oppose Western sport. In 1921, Soviet leaders and several worker organizations in Europe
formed the Red Sport International (RSI) as a substitute for the IOC. In 1928, the RSI hosted the
First Worker Spartakiad, a proletarian version of the Olympic Games.213
However, soccer did not experience that same isolation as other Soviet sports. In the
1920s, Soviet soccer clubs competed against worker-sponsored squads from around Europe. As
early as 1922, Soviet clubs toured Finland and Sweden, defeating amateur teams from their
respective leagues. In 1924, the Turkish national team played and lost four matches against a
Soviet team comprised of Moscow all-stars (a de facto national team). On the surface, the
domination of Soviet teams appears impressive, but Soviet squads rarely played quality
opposition in the 1920s. Two things hindered scheduling better teams. First, the Soviet Union
was not a member of FIFA, and therefore national soccer association were hesitant to allow their
top clubs to travel to the Soviet Union. Secondly, due to political opposition to the USSR,
governments opposed to communism occasionally refused to grant visas for Soviet players.214
The turning point occurred in October of 1934, when Czechoslovakia allowed Soviet
players to play an exhibition matches against professional Czech club Zidenice Brno. This club
was a significant increase in talent compared to previous Soviet competition. In the mid-1903s,
Czech soccer clubs were among the best in Europe; earlier that summer, Czechoslovakia finished
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as runner-up in the World Cup. Nevertheless, the Soviet team defeated Zidenice Brno 3-2.215
This victory bolstered Soviet beliefs that proletarian sport was superior to bourgeois sport.
Additionally, victory against a professional side garnered respect for Soviet soccer across
Europe. After the exhibition match in Czechoslovakia, Soviet teams received more invitations
from Western European nations. In the remaining years of the 1930s, Soviet teams both traveled
to and hosted more international matches against professional clubs. In 1935 and 1936, Soviet
squads journeyed to Paris to compete against teams in the top division of French soccer; they
claimed victory in 1935 but were narrowly defeated in 1936.216 In 1937, a team of Basque
professionals toured the Soviet Union to raise awareness for their cause during the Spanish Civil
War; they defeated all but one of their Soviet opponents.
Nearly all international soccer matches ceased during World War Two, but after the war,
the Soviet Union, now inhabiting a new position in the balance of global power, changed the role
of sport in their foreign policy. Instead of staying largely isolated from the rest of Europe and the
world, the USSR saw the benefits of participating in international competition and athletic
organizations. There were three major goals of sport within Soviet foreign policy: Attaining
supremacy in world sport, thus improving the status of the USSR and communism globally;
undermining the authority of bourgeois and capitalist nations over sport; and promoting friendly
relations with neighboring and pro-communist nations.217
As had been the case before the war, Soviet soccer teams were the first to engage in
international competitions to achieve these goals. In November 1945, Dinamo Moscow accepted
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an invitation to play four exhibition matches against British clubs. Dinamo shocked English
spectators (and likely pleasantly surprised Soviet fans) by winning twice, drawing twice, and
generally outplaying their opponents. The tour was a step in establishing Soviet sport supremacy
and eroding the power England held over global soccer. Following the success of Dinamo, other
Soviet clubs played abroad. TsSKA traveled to Prague, Spartak Moscow played in Albania, and
Dinamo Moscow took another tour, this time through Sweden and Finland. Furthermore, a team
of Moscow all-stars hosted Yugoslav and Bulgarian teams, Partizan Belgrade and Lokomotiv
Sofia.218 These matches promoted the friendly relationship with neighboring and pro-communist
nations, strengthening the USSR’s ties with those nations.
Overall, while most Soviet sports programs remained isolated from Western Europe,
especially during the pre-war period, soccer was always at the forefront of international
engagement. At the beginning of the Cold War, soccer continued its role as the USSR main
international sport. Through soccer, the Soviet Union was confident it would strengthen ties with
its allies, remove the control Western nations held over sport, and prove the worth of
communism and Soviet society through sporting victories.

The Hungarian Revolution on the Field, 1952-1955
Following numerous victories in exhibition matches, Soviet officials were optimistic
about the chance for success in the 1952 Helsinki Olympics. However, the tournament was much
more difficult than expected. In the opening round, the Soviet national team needed extra-time to
defeat Bulgaria 2-1. In the next round, the Soviet Union faced Yugoslavia. The USSR fell behind
early in the match and, with only thirty minutes left in the match, were losing 5-1. Yet, the
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Soviets rallied and tied the game in the next-to-last minute. Ultimately, the match ended in a 5-5
draw and a replay took place two days later; the Yugoslav team easily defeated the Soviets 3-1
and eliminated them from the tournament. The loss was embarrassing. The USSR had not even
reached the quarterfinals. Defeat to Yugoslavia during the height of the Stalin-Tito split only
added to the shame of the loss. Soviet newspapers did not even report the elimination of the
Soviet national team.
Coverage of soccer at the 1952 Olympic Games did not cease, though. The back pages of
Sovetskii Sport included results from competitions not involving Soviet athletes, but certain
results garnered more attention than others. While the performance of the Soviet national team
was exceedingly poor, the Hungarian national team played impressively well. Hungary was the
only Soviet ally left in the soccer tournament and therefore, became the new favorite team of the
Soviet press. In the first round of the tournament, Hungary defeated traditional soccer power
Italy by a score of 3-0.219 In the next round, they impressively defeated Turkey 7-1, with goals
from five different players. Turkey was a weak opponent and had benefited from the tournament
draw to make it to the quarterfinals, but the Hungarians proved their skill by dominating the
much more competitive Swedish national team 6-0 in the semifinals.220 This set up a
championship match against Yugoslavia.
The Hungarian squad played solid defense throughout the game but struggled to generate
offense. Their star striker, Ferenc Puskas, earned a penalty early in the match, but it was saved
by the Yugoslav goalkeeper. Finally, in the 71st minute, Puskas gained possession at the edge of
the penalty-box, beat his defenders, drew out the goalkeeper, and slotted a shot underneath him
to open the scoring. The goal invigorated the Hungarian squad to keep attacking and they
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overwhelmed Yugoslavia for the remainder of the match. “The success gave an even greater
boost to the actions of the Hungarian team,” wrote the Sovetskii Sport correspondent watching
the match. “The passes became more precise and the players moved even faster.”221 The
correspondent also highlighted the Yugoslav’s inability to handle the Hungarian strikers. Though
they were losing, “the team of Yugoslavia was forced to bring back another player on
defense.”222 Still, the extra defender was not enough; in the 88th minute, Hungarian winger
Zoltan Czibor added another goal to leave no doubt that Hungary would win the gold medal.
Ultimately, the journalist concluded that Hungary “deservedly won the title of champion” after
“demonstrating the highest quality of play.”223
Entering the 1952 Olympics, Soviet soccer officials hoped and expected to win gold and
secure the position of top team in Europe. Instead, Hungary won the gold medal and obtained the
respect the Soviets desired. Despite the Olympic championship, Hungary’s superiority over the
rest of Europe was not unanimous. England invented and codified the game, popularized it
across the globe, and the national team had never been beaten on British soil. In 1945, Dinamo
Moscow defeated two English clubs in England, but these teams were not national rosters and
English soccer was still in the process of rebuilding itself. After Hungary’s impressive
performance, England invited the national team to play an exhibition match in London.
After over a year of delays and compromises in planning the exhibition, the match finally
took place in London’s famed Wembley Stadium on November 25th, 1953. English fans and
reporters understood Hungary’s talent: “If all the fame that precedes [Hungary] bears an atom of
truth in it, then they will be worthy and great opponents,” wrote the London Times soccer
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correspondent, “The Hungarians… put their faith in swift, short passing, often carried out in a
bewildering pace… the Hungarian attacking system may cause some headaches.” Still, the
British were confident in their own ability to exploit their opponent’s offense. “Hungary are
essentially an attacking side,” commented the same reporter. “Defensive flaws have been
detected in them, especially in the full-backs who may be caught square [out of position]. It is
here that England will prod.”224
Dubbed “The Match of the Century,” over 100,000 spectators arrived at Wembley to
watch the match. Hungary’s attack-oriented system did indeed cause headaches from the very
start of the match. Within the first minute of the match, three Hungarian attackers confused the
English defense and scored on a powerful shot into the top corner of the goal. The Hungarians
keep pressing and overwhelmed the English side with their ball control. The Hungarians’ third
goal perfectly illustrated this technical superiority. Sandor Kocsis, one of the central forwards,
gained possession in the center of the pitch, passed the ball out wide to left winger Czibor, who
then lays the ball into the corner for the overlapping full-back. With lots of time and space, the
Hungarian full-back crossed the ball to Puskas in the center of the penalty area. English defender
Billy Wright attempted a slid tackle, but in a single, smooth movement, Puskas dragged the ball
back with his left foot and rocketed a shot past the goalkeeper, all while Wright helplessly slid
passed him.225 By halftime, Hungary led 4-2 and finished the match with a 6-3 victory.
The result shocked English observers. “Outpaced and outmaneuvered by this intelligent
exposition of football,” lamented the London Times, “England never were truly in the match.”226
The English defeat signaled the end of British preeminence over soccer. The historic game drew
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notice in Soviet media as well. Sovetskii Sport offered a rather mundane account of the match,
but in the closing paragraph, noted the momentous shift and praised the Hungarian side, writing
“The combined English soccer team was defeated on its own field for the first time… Thus the
Hungarian national soccer team again confirmed its high class and wrote another glorious page
in the history of Hungarian people’s sport.”227 In May of 1954, England played Hungary again,
but this time in Budapest. With Hungary’s superiority already proven, the match was not as
publicized as the first. Still, Hungary reinforced their positions as world’s best soccer team by
defeating England 7-1. After the match, the English players were in awe of their opposition, with
one player even commenting “I have never seen anything like it. They were men from another
planet.”228 This time, Sovetskii Sport provided a detailed report of the match, emphasizing the
talent and technique of the Hungarian side, though the article seemed to praise the defeat of
England rather than the victory of Hungary. “The English are suppressed,” claimed the
journalist. “They arrived in Budapest in a radiant mood and hopes for success but are forced to
leave the field in defeat.”229 Furthermore, the article stressed the political undertones of the
match, highlighting the fact that the First Secretary of the Hungarian Communist Party was in
attendance and dozens of journalists from other communist nations, such as Czechoslovakia,
Poland, and East Germany.230 In essence, Hungary’s victory was more than an athletic success; it
was a triumph for the entirety of Communist Eastern Europe over the traditional powers of
Western Europe.
The Hungarian national team was undisputedly the best team in the world and received
increased attention in the Soviet press. Typically, Sovetskii Sport provided little, if any, coverage
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to foreign matches not involving Soviet teams. Even when such matches were covered, it was
typically confined to a quarter-page article on the back page. However, the popularity of the
Hungarians garnered increased reportage in Soviet media. Even an uneventful exhibition match
between Austria and Hungary deserved an article on the front page of Sovetskii Sport.231
Furthermore, in the week leading up to the England-Hungary match in Budapest, an editorial
praised not just the development of soccer in Hungary, but the physical culture and sport
program as a whole.232
In 1954, the Soviet Union was therefore not invited to that year’s World Cup tournament
in Switzerland. However, as reigning Olympic champion, Hungary automatically received an
invitation. Without a home team to root for, Soviet press covered the Hungarians as if were their
own national team. Soviet journalists listed Hungarian results in articles along with all other
World Cup games, but often provided more detail and commentary than on other matches.233 The
tournament started well as Hungary thrashed first time competitors South Korea 9-0, the largest
victory in World Cup history at the time, and then defeated West Germany 8-3.234 Once in the
knockout stage, though, the competition was much fiercer. In the quarterfinals, Hungary faced
Brazil in an extremely physical match, which Sovetskii Sport described as the “most stressful
match of the tournament.”235 Leading 3-2 in the 71st, minute a Brazilian defender aggressively
fouled a Hungarian forward, prompting a violent retaliation; the referee sent off both players.
From then on, the match resembled a brawl rather than a soccer match. Another Brazilian player
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was ejected for fighting in the 79th minute. Eventually, Hungary won 4-2 after a late Kocsis goal
sealed the game.236
In the semifinals, Hungary took on defending champions Uruguay in a much more
refined, but just a difficult, match. Hungary jumped out to a 2-0 lead at halftime, but Uruguay
leveled the score by the end of regulation. In extra-time, Kocsis took control of the match,
scoring twice and securing a Hungarian victory.237 West Germany, whom Hungary had
emphatically defeated in the group stage of the tournament, awaited in the final. After defeating
Brazil and Uruguay, West Germany appeared to be the last and easiest hurdle on the path to
becoming World Cup Champion. Moreover, Puskas, who had been out with an ankle injury since
the group stage, returned to the squad. Within the first ten minutes of the match, both Puskas and
Czibor contributed a goal and it appeared Hungary’s coronation as world champions was all but
complete. Yet, within minutes, West Germany added two of their own to equalize the score. As
the game progressed, a field soaked from rain the day before became increasingly muddy,
hindering Hungary’s passing ability. Still, the Hungarians attacked relentlessly but were denied
by excellent goalkeeping (as well as two shots which deflected off the frame of the goal). With
less than ten minutes remaining, a West German striker found space at the top of the penalty box
and struck it low, into the corner of the goal, past the diving Hungarian goalkeeper.238 West
Germany stunned the soccer world en route to their first world championship.
The Soviet Union was not exempt from the shock of Hungary’s loss either. The Sovetskii
Sport report continually emphasized the superior skill of the Hungarians and blamed the loss on
poor conditions. “The German soccer players, according to many observers, did not play at a
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high technical level,” stated the article, “but their counterattacks were very dangerous, especially
since the conditions in which the match was played were not conducive to a technical game.”239
Additionally, incompetent refereeing also contributed to the defeat. Six minutes after West
Germany’s go-ahead goal, Puskas scored again, only to have it disallowed for offsides.
Naturally, the Hungarians were upset, but according to most accounts, the call was correct. Even
before the ball crossed the goal line, West German defenders were signaling for offsides. Also,
the German broadcaster stated that Puskas was offsides before the ref blew the whistle.240
However, Soviet journalists were not convinced, commenting “Although the English referee
Lind stated that Puskas was in an ‘offside’ position, opinions on the issue were sharply
divided.”241 Who else disagreed with the offside decision was never stated, but the tone of the
article was clear: Hungary was the better team, but due to poor weather, inept referees, and bad
luck, the World Cup title had been taken from them.
During the first half of the 1950s, the Hungarian national side attained a level of
popularity and coverage in Sovetskii Sport that rivaled domestic Soviet clubs and even the Soviet
national team. Hungarian stars such as Ferenc Puskas and Sandor Kocsis were nearly as wellcovered by the Soviet press as stars like Iashin and Simonian. A major goal of Soviet soccer, and
all sport, in the international arena was to prove that socialist nations produced better citizens and
athletes.242 The Soviet Union had taken a step towards this goal in 1945 when Dinamo Moscow
went undefeated against the best clubs England had. However, the Soviet national team then
retreated from international attention and did not engage in more high-profile matches, instead
opting the compete against lower quality opponents. When the Soviet national team reemerged
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into foreign competition, they lost dramatically to Yugoslavia. Essentially, when the eyes of the
global soccer community were on the Soviet Union, the team failed to live up to expectations.
Hungary, however, excelled in the tournament and won the gold medal. The next year, Hungary
defeated the English national team in Wembley Stadium, the mecca of European soccer. Lastly,
though they lost the final, Hungary captivated spectators at the 1954 World Cup, setting records
for both individual and team goals scored in a single tournament.243

Diagram 9: Hungary’s tactics against England, taken from Sebes’s notebook (Source: Puskas on Puskas, 92)

It was not only the success of Hungary, but how Hungary achieved their success that
captivated Soviet audiences. Like Dinamo Moscow in 1945, Hungary also played a system that
emphasized ball possession, skilled passing, and interchangeable positions. It is unclear if
Gusztav Sebes, the Hungarian manager, directly based his strategy on Dinamo Moscow, but he
also used a base system of a W-M with a withdrawn center-forward. However, Sebes continued
to modify the formation, allowing both full-backs to push higher, leaving the center-back as a
roaming sweeper. The two inside forwards, usually Puskas and Koscsis also played high upfield,
often overlapping the center-forward which player even deeper than Beskov had done while at
Dinamo Moscow. Sebes’ formation could be called a 1-4-1-4 rather than a W-M. Each of these
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modifications was done so that players had more passing options with the ball, more freedom of
movement away from the ball, and ultimately, increased scoring opportunities.
Overall, the Hungarian national team of the early 1950s was the best in the world and
revolutionized how the rest of the world played soccer. Their style enthralled soccer fans around
the world, but especially in the Soviet Union. Essentially, the Hungarian team accomplished the
goals which USSR officials had hoped Soviet soccer would. Dinamo Moscow proved that Soviet
teams could compete with English clubs, that communist societies could produce skilled athletes,
and that soccer based on teamwork and flexible positions was an alternative to the British model
of kick and chase. Hungary went a step further, dominating the English national team in their
home stadium, fielding the best soccer players in the world, and transforming the way soccer was
player.

The Hungarian Revolution off the Field, 1956-1957
After the World Cup defeat, Hungary recovered and began another undefeated streak of
international matches. The team shook off the loss and focused on the next major international
tournament: The 1956 Olympics in Melbourne. However, beginning in early 1956, their
consistency faltered. They uncharacteristically lost to Turkey, then suffered defeat to Belgium. In
May of 1956, Hungary lost 4-2 to Czechoslovakia in Budapest, the Hungarians’ first defeat at
home since 1943.244 Their irregular play can be attributed to multiple factors. First, Hungary
played a full schedule of international matches, and players also had obligations to their domestic
clubs as well; many soccer players were worn out by a rigorous schedule. Secondly, the
Hungarian Soccer Association was in a state of flux. In 1955, officials removed Gusztav Sebes
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as manager, though he still remained active in the organization. The new manager sought to
bring more young players into the squad to challenge established stars.245 Thirdly, Hungarian
society in general was increasingly instable. Political turmoil certainly weighed on players’
minds as they represented their nation on the soccer field.
In February of 1956, Nikita Khrushchev delivered a speech at the Twentieth Congress of the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Known as the “Secret Speech,” Khrushchev’s speech was
critical of Stalin, exposed the crimes he committed, and called for party reform. The speech soon
made its way outside of the Soviet Union, including Hungary. There, the anti-Stalin message
ignited an already divided political system. Much of the public called for the resignation of
Hungarian Communist Party leader Matyas Rakosi and the installment of Imre Nagy, who had
been Communist Party General Secretary until 1955. In July, Rakosi left office under pressure
from the public and from the Soviet Union, but instead of Nagy, appointed Erno Gero, a likeminded politician, to his position. Protests against the government and Soviet interference in
Hungarian politics continued and grew increasingly violent.246
Amidst the deteriorating relationship between Hungary and the Soviet Union, the Hungarian
national team traveled to Moscow. The Central Lenin Stadium (now Luzhniki Stadium) had just
been completed and a match between the Soviet national team and the Hungarians before over
100,000 spectators was the christening event. The Soviets were hopeful. They, too, were in the
process of preparing for the Olympic tournament and victories over other powerful soccer
nations, specifically West Germany, increased their confidence. Both teams desired victory for
both sporting and political reasons.
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Given both teams’ proclivity for a passing-based, less physical style of soccer, the match was
especially violent. Early on, both teams created chances to score, but only Hungary capitalized;
Czibor scored in the 16th minute and it would be the only goal of the match. Yet, the rest of the
game contained many more chances. Streltsov beat the Hungarian goalkeeper only to have a
retreating defender clear the ball before it completely crossed the goal line. Another Soviet goal
was disallowed for offsides.247 Hungary had opportunities to extend their lead too, but Iashin
played brilliantly, producing an amazing save from a Kocsis header. “Iashin stretched out his
great body and prevented trouble,” recalled famed Soviet sportswriter Axel Vartanian, who
witnessed the game. “I’ve watched soccer for more than six decades, but I have not seen
anything like it.”248 In the second half, as frustration grew, both teams participated in excessive
fouling. Soviet coach Gavriil Kachalin commented that “The match was overshadowed by
rudeness.”249 Still, the scoreboard did not change, and Hungary spoiled the new stadium’s
opening with a 1-0 victory. The game disheartened the Soviet players, but it affected the
Hungarian players and fans beyond the soccer field. “One of the matches we Hungarians were
always desperate to win, of course, was any game against the Russians,” remembered Puskas.
“We finally beat the Soviets in Moscow 1-0, exactly a month before the October Uprising began.
But I hadn’t realized there were so many people in Hungary who wanted to beat the Russians at
more than just soccer.”250
In late October, tension in Hungary reached a tipping point. A student-led protest organized
over 200,000 people to demand the withdrawal of Soviet troops stationed in Hungary and for
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Nagy to take Gero’s position. Eventually, student protesters tore down a statue of Stalin, then
directly clashed with Soviet and Hungarian security forces while trying to take over a local radio
station. The next day, Nagy assumed the position of Prime Minister and demanded that Soviet
troops leave Hungary. However, Khrushchev did not recognize Nagy as a legal representative
and therefore the demand was not valid.251 Ultimately, Khrushchev decided that military force
was necessary to quell the protests and restore order. On November 4th, Soviet tanks and troops
entered Budapest and after a week of heavy street fighting, the USSR declared victory over what
they viewed as a counterrevolution.252
At the time of the uprising, the Hungarian national team had just returned from an
international match in Austria. Each player returned to their domestic club, though many national
team players, including Puskas, played from the Hungarian army team, Budapest Honved.
However, Hungarian soccer authorities quickly suspended league matches. Once the fighting in
the streets escalated, however, concerns about the players’ safety increased. At one point, the
Hungarian media reported Puskas had been killed in the fighting.253 In an effort to move the team
out of the country as quickly as possible. During the 1956 season, Honved was the Hungarian
representative in the newly formed European Cup, a continental tournament for domestic teams.
They were scheduled to host Athletic Bilbao (a Spanish club) in Budapest in November. The cup
organizers threatened to ban Honved from further tournaments if they did not host the match.
Knowing hosting a game in Budapest was impossible, the Hungarian Soccer Association agreed
to play the match in Bilbao, hoping that the conflict would be resolved in time to play the second
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match.254 On November 22nd, Honved lost to Athletic Bilbao in Spain by 3-2. The team stayed
abroad the over the next month and, refusing to return to Budapest amid the turmoil. Other teams
had also traveled abroad to avoid the fighting. Furthermore, the entire under-21 Hungarian youth
team defected while playing a tournament in Belgium.255 Consequently, the Hungarian Soccer
Association was unable to field a team in the 1956 Olympics and withdrew from the tournament.
The next month, Honved arranged to “host” Athletic Bilbao in Brussels for the second match;
they game ended in a 3-3 draw and Honved exited the European Cup.256
Still wary of returning to Hungary, in January of 1957, Honved again decided not to return,
instead opting to embark on a fundraising tour in South America. As the team of the Hungarian
Army, Honved’s refusal embarrassed and incensed the Hungarian Soccer Association. In
response, they offered an ultimatum to the players: Return or be banned from soccer. According
to Kalman Vandor, a Hungarian journalist, the ultimatums were meant to be a display of
strength, both to intimidate the players and impress the Soviet Union. The new Hungarian Soccer
Association president Marton Nagy “fancied himself as a ‘hard man’ and felt he had to put on a
tough show to impress the Soviets,” recalled Vandor. “It was a terrible message to send to our
greatest players.”257 As team captain, Puskas faced the harshest punishment, a ban of eighteen
months. While most players capitulated, the biggest stars remained abroad. Czibor, Kocsis, and
Puskas all defected. First, they initially trained in Italy while FIFA debated the validity of their
bans. After several months, FIFA judged the bans illegitimate and allowed the Hungarians to
sign contracts with teams outside of Hungary.
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Many European clubs wanted the talents of Czibor, Kocsis, and especially Puskas. On
their way to tour South America, Honved played an exhibition match in Madrid against a team of
Spanish all-stars. The match impressed many Spanish clubs, who were able to establish personal
relationships with some of the players. Therefore, in the pursuit of signing the Hungarians,
Spanish clubs had an edge over other teams in Europe. Eventually, both Czibor and Kocsis
signed for Barcelona, while Puskas signed a contract with Real Madrid. Playing for Spanish
clubs was even more offensive than refusing to return to Hungary. In a matter of months, they
went from Hungarian heroes to traitors. “When Puskas started playing for Real [Madrid],”
recounts fellow player Lajos Tichy, who returned to Hungary, “we heard little more than the
results of the matches. You see, the political leaders were blamed by the people for driving him
and others out of Hungary.”258 In essence, these three players chose the soccer and lifestyle of
fascist Spain over their communist homeland.
Just as the Hungarian national team disintegrated, so did the Soviet fascination and
admiration of those players. The defeat to Hungary in Moscow soured the attitudes of many fans.
It was exciting when Hungary dominated Western, bourgeois teams. Yet, it seemed improper
that they defeated the nation which began the communist revolution. When Hungarian players
refused to return to Hungary and eventually settled in fascist Spain, Soviet media refused to
cover their performances any longer. The Hungarian national team had served as the secondteam for Soviet media and soccer fans for years, but all respect faded away and disdain took its
place.
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Soviet-Spanish Relations
The move to Spain irked the Soviet Union both in terms of both politics and soccer.
Fascist Spain was a natural political enemy of the communist Soviet Union, but the two nations
also shared a history on the soccer field. Spanish players held a unique place in Soviet soccer
history. In 1937, during the Spanish Civil War, a squad of all-stars from Basque toured Europe,
raising awareness and funds for their anti-Franco cause. The Basques stayed in the USSR for
over two months, playing nine matches and winning all but one game. Their success inspired
Soviet teams to adopt their W-M formation and move on from the obsolete 2-3-5 system.
However, pro-Franco forces prevailed, and Spain became an enemy of the Soviet Union.
After World War Two, Spain and the USSR had no soccer-related interaction. The Soviet Union
limited its international matches to typically weaker, Eastern European opponents, and Spain
followed a similar path, scheduling neighboring countries such as Portugal, Italy, and France
more frequently (though these opponents were much tougher than, say, Finland). Spain placed
fourth at the 1950 World Cup in Brazil, but as the USSR did not even attempt to qualify.
Additionally, Spain did not emphasize Olympic participation in any sport, and therefore, did not
qualify for either Olympic soccer tournament during the 1950s. Both nations were attempting to
build a national team to win internationally and validate their government and culture but took
separate paths to reach this goal.
Another difference in Spanish soccer was the focus on domestic clubs. In the Soviet
Union, while Moscow was the epicenter of soccer, Dinamo Tbilisi, Dinamo Kiev, and Zenit
Leningrad also boasted strong squads. Also, five Moscow-based teams typically played in the
Soviet Top League. Therefore, Soviet talent was spread-out across the nation. Spain, however,
funneled its talent to only a handful of clubs. Two Madrid clubs, Real Madrid and Atletico de
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Madrid, as well as Barcelona received the top Spanish players. The best of these three clubs,
Real Madrid, became an important tool in Spanish foreign policy. After World War Two, the
Franco regime attempted to distance itself from its fascist origins and symbols, but Europe still
boycotted Spain economically and diplomatically. To improve the image of Spain, Real Madrid
became Franco’s European ambassador. Real Madrid president Santiago Bernebeu reflected this
purpose, stating “Our club, and all of us, carry with us our affection and our obligations to our
country, and deeply engrave in our conscience is the idea of seeking and finding, at every
opportunity, something which will effectively reflect the glory and prestige of Spain.”259
As a method to further this effort, Spain enthusiastically supported the creation of the
European Cup in 1955, a tournament between domestic clubs to determine the best team on the
continent. The organizers did not ask the Soviet Union to participate, but invitations were
extended to Poland, Hungary, and Yugoslavia. Real Madrid won the inaugural tournament, but
nearly forfeited their semifinal match as the Spanish government refused to entry to Partizan
Belgrade. Eventually, Spanish soccer officials smuggled the Yugoslav team past customs and
passport control, only to be beaten 4-0 by Real Madrid.260 The tournament was hugely popular
and expanded its number of participants to 28 by 1959. More communist nations joined, such as
Czechoslovakia, Romania, and Bulgaria. However, the Soviet Union continually declined to
send a team.
The addition of Ferenc Puskas to Real Madrid’s roster in 1959 only served to deter Soviet
participation. In the Soviet perspective, the European Cup encouraged capitalism and corruption.
“Regulations of the European Cup,” wrote an editor of Futbol i Khokkei, “allow the purchase and
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sale of players, and performances of anyone, under the guise of a club… Thus, there is a coarse
intervention of money in sports.”261 The article also attacked allowing the defending cup
champion to enter the tournament automatically, even if the club did not win its domestic league
the season before; a situation which allowed Real Madrid to win five straight titles. Essentially,
to Soviet observers, the tournament was a fixed system to keep popular, established teams like
Real Madrid at the forefront of European soccer. “In our opinion, the cup system needs
reformed… in order to keep ‘Don’ Bernebeu from influencing the fate of the cup.”262 Lastly,
such stagnation ruined the level of competition. The article ended with the pessimistic line, “For
now we are dealing with a distressing reality, a dull reality, of the European Cup.”263

Figure 5: South America leads the Madrid squad with the caption “the Real Madrid team – ‘pride of European soccer’ - runs out
onto the field” (Source: Futbol i Khokkei, 6.19.1960)

In actuality, the European Cup was far from dull. The 1960 edition of tournament saw the
most thrilling final to date. Real Madrid, let by their international rosters of superstars, which
now included a fit and in-form Puskas, faced Eintracht Frankfurt from West Germany. After
going down by a goal early, Real Madrid rallied in dramatic fashion; Argentine star Alfredo di
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Stefano scored a hattrick while Puskas netted four goals in a 7-3 victory. “Everything we did
seemed to come off and though we started slowly,” said Puskas, remembering the final, “once
we hit that peak we felt we could beat any side in the world… The whole team struck gold at the
same time. It was a privilege to be there.”264 The Soviet media did not cover the match
extensively, though. Sovetskii Sport opted to focus that issue’s international coverage on
Raymond Kopa, a French player who left the Real Madrid team midway through the season to
return to France.265 Amidst the article denouncing the European Cup, Futbol i Khokkei merely
stated that “the match was really exciting,” but lamented the number of foreign players fielded
by Real Madrid, especially the “infamous Hungarian renegade Puskas.”266 In the end, politics
kept the Soviet media from acknowledging a thrilling tournament final.
The soccer paths of Spain and the Soviet Union finally crossed shorty after Real Madrid’s
victory. Another tournament, the inaugural European Nation’s Cup (essentially a World Cup
tournament, but only for European countries) took place in 1960. Many prominent soccer
nations, such as England and West Germany, chose not to compete, but both Spain and the
Soviet Union entered the competition and were drawn to face each other in the quarterfinals. The
format copied the European Cup, which required two matches at each team’s home stadium. This
meant the Spanish team had to play in Moscow while the Soviet team needed to travel to Madrid,
a situation neither team enjoyed. However, Spain decided to withdraw from the tournament
rather than play a home-and-away series with the USSR. The decision stunned and insulted
Soviet officials. “The USSR Federation of Soccer is deeply indignant at the interference of the
Franco authorities, which thwarted the meeting of Spanish and Soviet soccer players,” stated the
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organizations official statement in Sovetskii Sport. “Fascist Franco and his henchmen have long
been known for their hostility to friendly contacts.”267 Additionally, the Soviet Soccer Federation
used the statement to criticize Franco’s government as a whole, writing “Unfortunately, the
Spanish Soccer Federation did not find enough courage to make a strong protest against the
violation elementary democratic freedoms.”268 Sovetskii Sport also featured a letter written,
presumably, by the members of the Soviet national team. “The arbitrary act by the Franco
government testifies… its effort to bring elements of the Cold War into Sport.”269 Apparently,
the hypocrisy of Soviets disapproving the introduction of politics into sport was not considered
by the editors of Sovetskii Sport, as the USSR had avoided participation in previous World Cups
and European Cup tournaments on political grounds. From a Spanish perspective, it may be that
Franco was not worried about the Spanish team traveling to Moscow as he was about the Soviet
team playing in Madrid. He did not want the Soviet anthem to be played nor the Soviet flag to be
flown at the stadium.270 Allegedly Franco feared the match would double as communist
propaganda and potentially rally for Spanish Civil War exiles and supports of the Spanish
Republic.271 Regardless of the reasoning, the Soviet Union advanced through forfeit and
eventually won the championship that summer.
Four years later, the two squads were set to face each other again. However, this time it
was in the championship and Spain was hosting the tournament. Neither Spain nor the Soviet
Union could afford to withdraw from the match. Franco was still uneasy about a Soviet presence
in Madrid and feared that if the visitors won, he would have to present the trophy to a
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communist.272 Fortunately for him, though, Spain won the championship in an exciting match.
Both teams scored within the first ten minutes, but the defenses kept their opposing attacks silent
until the 84th minute, when a Spanish striker capitalized on a Soviet defensive error to score the
winning goal. The victory was a momentous triumph for Franco and Spain. It was the nation’s
first championship won by the Spanish national team, but more importantly, it was Franco’s
political victory over communism. Spanish player Jesus Pereda recounts the final, stating “When
we played in Madrid, it was pure politics…It was Franco against communism. For him it was not
just a battle, it was war.”273
From a soccer perspective, the Soviet loss was tolerable. Defeating a skilled team such
as Spain in their home stadium would be a tough task for any team in the world; the Soviets
matched the Spaniards evenly only until the final few minutes. Futbol i Khokkei detailed every
squandered scoring opportunity by the Soviets and described the players as “uncomfortable” and
“confused” on the pitch.274 The close defeat was difficult for the players. In Igor Netto’s
autobiography, published a decade after the championship loss, he barely discusses the
tournament.275 Vartanian, granted a biased observer, concluded that making the Soviet team
uncomfortable was a purposeful strategy by the Spanish Soccer Federation; the start time was
moved up two hours, during peak mid-day heat.276 Despite the conditions, the Soviet team
played admirably and came close to winning back-to-back European Nation’s Cups. However,
on a political level, the defeat was disastrous. Fascism had defeated communism, at least of the
soccer pitch. Khrushchev was furious and removed Konstantin Beskov as national team
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manager; he occupied the position only a few months. The irrational firing of Beskov was one of
Khrushchev’s final actions before being removed from power only a few months later. 277

Hungary Resurgent
While Spain and the Soviet Union were two of the best teams in Europe during the early
1960s, Hungary was quietly rebuilding a very competitive team. After the disintegration of the
national team, a handful of stars from the World Cup team remained, but the most the roster was
filled with emerging, young talent. In 1958, Hungary managed to qualify for the World Cup, but
could not move past the group stage. In 1960, they earned a bronze medal at the Rome Olympics
and in 1962, progressed to the quarterfinal round before losing to eventual runners-up
Czechoslovakia.
In 1964, Hungary surprisingly defeated France to qualify for the European Nation’s Cup.
In the semi-finals, they faced Spain. The Hungarians who had defected to Spain and became
Spanish citizens – Puskas, Czibor, and Kocsis – no longer played for the national team, but
tensions between the two nations remained intense. The match was physical from the first
whistle, though the referee awarded very few fouls. The Spaniards opened the scoring in the 35th
minute, but the Hungarians equalized only six minutes from the end of regulation, forcing extratime. However, even worse than the aggressive play on the field was violence emanating from
the crowd. During extra-time, the crowd, perhaps fearing losing, grew agitated and began
insulting the Hungarian team. Then several bottles were thrown at the Hungarian bench; the
Spanish police force acting as security only removed a single fan from the stadium. Such
behavior “indicates the lack of necessary order for the Madrid stadium in such a crucial
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match.”278 Eventually, the Spanish side scored the winning goal in the 122nd minute to advance.
Hungary, only eight years removed from the loss of their greatest players, had been close to
reaching the final to meet the Soviet Union.
The new Hungarian side of the 1960s revolved around young players. Ferenc Bene
captained the 1964 team at only age nineteen, but twenty-two-year-old Florian Albert was the
heart of the team. His dribbling and striking skills drew comparisons to Puskas, but Albert was
younger, thinner, and quicker. In the 1962 World Cup, Albert tied as the top goal scorer of the
tournament and FIFA named him Best Young Player of the tournament.279 Heading into the 1966
World Cup, the young group of Hungarians which had overachieved early in the decade were
now hitting the peak of their career. Therefore, Hungary was a popular choice to advance far in
the tournament and a dark-horse pick to win the championship. Yet, after an opening defeat to
Portugal, Hungary needed to beat two-time defending champion Brazil in order to advance out of
the group stage. Stunningly, the Hungarians thrashed the Brazilians 3-1, dominating the ball
from the very start of the match. Journalist Gyorgy Szepesi praised the aggressive approach. “At
a time when the static, defensive style seemed to dominate the game, they brought… a glimpse
of the majestic spectacular football that combines beauty, fascinating movement and artistically
designed and taken goals.”280 Hungary finished the group stage with another 3-1 win, this time
over Bulgaria; they entered the knock-out with confidence and momentum.
The quarterfinal draw pitted Hungary against the Soviet Union. Not only was the fixture
politically charged off the field, but on the field the two sides differed from each other. The
Soviet Union employed a defensive-minded approach and relied on counter-attacks to generate
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offense, while Hungary depended on ball-possession and movement. The day of the match,
Sovetskii Sport printed an article detailing the two nations’ soccer history with one another,
listing both Soviet victories and losses to the Hungarians, including the 1956 meeting in
Moscow, but made no mention of the politics surrounding the match.281 In the quarterfinal
match, the Soviet Union capitalized on two defensive mistakes by the Hungarian defense to take
a two-goal lead. Hungary added a second-half goal but could not equalize and lost 2-1.282 In the
post-match report, however, the Soviet press resumed their adoring praise of the Hungarian
squad. “This victory is all the more gratifying,” stated Sovetskii Sport, “since our friends have
shown in this championship such a game that puts them among the best teams in the world.”283
As the decade before, the Soviet press treated Hungary on almost equal terms as the
Soviet national team. Perhaps the Soviet journalists felt pity for the breakup on the team in 1956,
or maybe the tone would have been different if the Soviet Union had lost, but the Soviets praised
the Hungarians nonetheless. The revitalized coverage of the Hungarian national team mirrored
the restored political relationship between the USSR and Hungary. In the years following Soviet
military intervention, new Hungarian prime minister Janos Kadar systematically eliminated those
involved in the uprising; by 1958, the high-profile revolutionaries were either arrested or
executed. With all remnants of the uprising removed, relations between Hungary and the Soviet
Union quickly resumed to pre-1956 friendliness.284
In both soccer and politics, Hungary posed a threat to the Soviet Union. The Hungarian
national team was poised to beat the Soviet Union to the rank of greatest team in the world while
political revolutionaries fought to break away from Soviet influence. The ruthless Soviet military
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intervention ended both threats. In 1966, the Hungarian national team once again threatened to
overtake the Soviet team. Yet as before, the Soviet Union ended Hungarian soccer ambitions.
Only instead of through political and military intervention, this time the Soviets beat the
Hungarians on the soccer field.

Conclusion
The Golden Age of Soviet soccer largely coincided with the best years for both the
Hungarian and Spanish national teams as well. As these nations’ politics were intertwined during
the 1950s and 1960s, so too were their soccer teams. At the beginning of the 1950s, Hungary
displayed a superior and innovative style of soccer, dominating traditionally powerful soccer
nations and nearly winning the World Cup. The Soviet Union enjoyed their success as proof of
the superiority of communist sport. However, Hungary’s success also threated the Soviet
Union’s position, at least athletically, as the leader of communist Europe. The Hungarian soccer
threat combined with social and political challenges to Moscow in 1956, which ended with
Soviet military intervention in Budapest and the break-up of the Hungarian national team.
The biggest Hungarian stars fled to fascist Spain, further worsening Soviet attitudes
toward Hungarian soccer. Puskas, Czibor, and Kocsis ended up playing for the largest domestic
clubs in the Spanish league. The addition of the Hungarian defectors provided the Soviet Union
with an athletic reason to further dislike their political rival. The Spanish system of soccer was
the complete opposite of the Soviets, the Spanish League emphasized strong domestic clubs,
embraced adding foreign players to their roster, and initiated competition competitions. Still,
these conflicting approaches produced two of the best teams of the decade, culminating in a
European Nation’s Cup for each country. However, both teams also suffered embarrassment;
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Spain drew international ire for withdrawing from the tournament and the Soviet Union lost in
Madrid and had to watch Franco present the trophy to his own team.
Soviet foreign policy played a large role in both the success and failures of the national
team. On the field, the foreign relations surrounding the Soviet national team benefited the
squad. After the conclusion of World War Two, the increase in foreign competition ultimately
improved the quality of Soviet players and the national team. The Soviet Union’s two
tournament championships came in the 1956 Olympics and the 1960 European Nations Cup.
Yet, both tournaments were complicated by the withdrawal of Hungary in 1956 and Spain in
1960. It is possible that the Soviet Union would have still won each respective tournament, but
their path to the championship was made much easier. However, after 1966 World Cup, the
ramifications of Soviet foreign relations negatively affected the success of the Soviet soccer.
During the 1966-1967, the Soviet Union finally agreed to send their title winning team to the
European Cup, creating the potential to play teams like Real Madrid or Barcelona. Yet, in 1968,
political tensions surrounding the Prague Spring caused the organizers of the European Cup to
place all Eastern European against each other in the opening round. The Soviet Soccer
Federation protested and when UEFA refused to re-draw the matches, they led the communist
European nations in a boycott of the tournament. However, the influence of the Soviet Union
was not as powerful as they wished. The representatives from Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and
Romania refused to participate in the boycott.285 Additionally, a political decision definitively
ended the Golden Age of Soviet soccer. In the process of qualifying for the 1974 World Cup, the
Soviet Union needed to defeat Chile in a two-game, home and away series. The first match in
Moscow ended in a scoreless draw, but before the second match could be played in Chile, a

285

Radnedge, 50 Years of European Cup and Champions League, 76.

127

military coup installed the anti-communist Augusto Pinochet. The Soviets refused to play a
match in the same stadium which the Pinochet regime used as a prison and torture site. When an
alternate venue was not chosen, the Soviet Soccer Federation withdrew from the tournament.286
After forfeiting from the 1974 World Cup, the national team failed to qualify for another
international tournament until 1982.
Overall, Soviet soccer reflected the complex nature of Soviet foreign policy during the
1950s and 1960s. Concerning the goals of proving the superiority of communist athletics and
promoting friendly relations, the results were mixed. The national team succeeded in several
tournaments, but also habitually underachieved and lost high-profile matches against political
rivals. In Eastern Europe, many exhibition matches between communist clubs were held, but the
friendly relationship on the field failed to solve any problems off the field.
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Conclusion and Epilogue
Between 1950 and 1970, Soviet soccer improved dramatically, and the USSR became a
highly competitive nation in international soccer. The years from 1956 to 1966 were the peak of
success. In that decade, the Soviet Union national soccer team experienced the most successful
decade in their history. Out of the six international tournaments they entered, the team won the
championship twice, finished as runner-up once, and always advanced to at least the
quarterfinals. Soviet stars Lev Iashin, Igor Netto, and Eduard Streltsov had the best years of their
careers during this decade.
This decade was also a period of dramatic transformation in Soviet society as well.
Domestically, Khrushchev worked to move past the legacy and negative effects of Stalinism
while on the international level, the Soviet Union was a principal combatant in the Cold War.
Therefore, Khrushchev needed to simultaneously promote socialism and Soviet ideology
worldwide while reforming Soviet society domestically. Success in sport, especially soccer, was
a method to achieve both these feats. Victorious Soviet athletes that embodied values of Soviet
masculinity, modesty, and discipline provided socialist role models for fans, both at home and
abroad. Soviet clubs that played an attractive style of soccer based on ideological principles
proved that a communist culture could produce highly skilled and competitive. Lastly, soccer
offered the Soviet Union a mode of direct competition with hostile nations; if advancements in
military technology and space flight could not confirm the USSR’s superiority, perhaps victory
on the soccer field could.
Yet, victory often proved to be elusive for the Soviet Union. The two championships,
both won against Yugoslavia, certainly elevated the status of Soviet soccer, but the national team
also lost to political rivals in high-profile matches: Fascist Spain in the 1964 European Nations
Cup final and capitalist West Germany in the 1966 World Cup semifinals. Especially when
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compared to the success of the Soviet national ice hockey team and Soviet Olympians, the
national soccer team continually fell short of the expectations set by government officials, sports
journalists, and fans.
Additionally, the effort to export Soviet culture through soccer also exposed Soviet
audiences to Western, capitalist forms of the sport. As the Soviet Union gradually integrated with
global soccer organizations, foreign audiences of Soviet soccer increased. However, so too did
Soviet audiences of Western soccer. This contact with foreign players, clubs, and fans
undermined the effort to maintain a distinctly Soviet version of soccer. Instead of acting as a tool
for victory in the Cold War, soccer itself became a battleground between Soviet and Western
ideologies.
Throughout the golden age, Soviet teams, players, coaches, and fans gradually became
more Western. The image of Soviet soccer players evolved away from the typical masculine
Russian athlete and increasingly resembled superstars from Western nations and clubs. The style
of Soviet soccer incorporated attributes of Western soccer into its tactics to remain competitive.
The Soviet Soccer Federation moved away from isolationist philosophy of the late 1940s and
early 1950s, even to the point of boycotting the European Cup when UEFA grouped Eastern
Bloc nations together (a move which likely would have pleased the Soviet Soccer Federation ten
years earlier).
The struggle to maintain a unique version of soccer in the Soviet Union was symptomatic
of Soviet society as a whole. The success of the Soviet national team coincided with the peak of
Khrushchev’s reforms and new economic, political, and social programs. Many in the Soviet
Union enthusiastically supported the new plans and were excited about the prospect of achieving
true communism. However, this period was followed by an era of economic stagnation and

130

disillusionment in Soviet society. Similarly, after the end of the golden age, the quality of Soviet
soccer, especially on the national level, dropped significantly. The national team failed to qualify
for either the World Cup or the European Nations Cup for over a decade. The national did not
reach the final of a major tournament until 1988, only to have a promising generation of players
broken up with the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In many ways, Soviet soccer, even during the
golden age, reflected the fluctuations between hope and disappointment in Soviet society.
In the summer of 2018, Russia will host the FIFA World Cup. For the first time, the
world’s most popular athletic competition will take place of Russian soil. Naturally, excitement
and expectation of the Russian national team are high. Yet, the legacy of the Golden Age of
Soviet soccer still looms over the current generation of players, coaches, and fans. Even the
official World Cup poster features Lev Iashin In many ways, the same issues facing Soviet
soccer during its Golden Age are present in Russian soccer in the lead up to the tournament.
Appropriate player and fan behavior, maintaining a distinctly Russian style of soccer, and
political conflicts have dominated the headlines leading up to the tournament.

Figure 6: The 2018 World Cup Poster featuring Lev Iashin (Source: FIFA.com)

When Russia was awarded the right to host the tournament in 2010, the Russian team had
recently reached the semifinals of the 2008 European Nations Cup, playing an entertaining,
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offensive-oriented style of soccer. At the time FIFA awarded the World Cup, Russia appeared to
be a reinvigorated and rapidly improving soccer nation. “The decision corresponds with FIFA’s
philosophy for developing soccer, especially in those regions of the word where that
development is needed,” commented then Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin.287 However,
concerns about Russia hosting the World Cup quickly emerged.
Among the main issues regarding Russian soccer was the actions of their fans inside and
outside the stadium. Russia participated in the 2012 European Nations Cup, co-hosted by Poland
and Ukraine. The Russian team itself was uninspiring, but travelling fans acted controversially.
FIFA fined the Russian soccer federation after fans chanted racist insults against a black player
during their opening match against the Czech Republic. In their second match, in Warsaw
against host nation Poland, Russian fans unfurled a giant banner picturing a bogatyr (a traditional
Russian warrior) with the phrase “This is Russia” across the bottom. This deliberate act of
antagonism resulted in chaotic fighting after between Russian and Polish fans after the match. 288
Four years later during the 2016 edition of the same tournament, Russian hooligans increased
their degree of violence, inciting riots both in the stadium and on the streets against English fans.
The violence was so severe that FIFA considered disqualifying Russia midway through the
tournament.289 In the lead up the 2018 World Cup, Russian hooligan groups have threatened to
fight and intimidate foreign fans.290
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On the field, Russia’s performances have faltered as well. After their semifinal run in
2008, Russia has failed to either qualify or advance past the group stage in every tournament.
Even when Russia hosted the 2017 Confederations Cup, a warm-up tournament for the World
Cup, the Russian team only earned a single victory. Much of the issues plaguing the Russian
national team is a return to isolationist policies. While Russian teams compete in international
tournaments, new rules from the Russian Soccer Federation require national team players to play
for clubs located in Russia. Therefore, many of Russia’s top players left foreign leagues to
compete in the less-competitive Russian league, resulting in the decline of their play.
Still, many international players from around the world compete in the Russian league.
Over the past decade, many of the top players in Russia have come from Europe and South
America. However, the influx of non-Russian players has not pleased some Russian fans.
African players have been the target of multiple racists actions. Even the largest supporter group
by Russian League champion Zenit Saint Petersburg sent a letter to the club, urging the owner to
sell the team’s dark-skinned players.291 However, other foreign players have obtained Russian
citizenship and may even feature on Russia’s World Cup roster.292 Whatever the ethnic make-up
of the players in the Russian League, the development of the national team has stagnated over
the past decade and Russia will enter the World Cup as the lowest ranked team in the field; the
first time the host nation has been the lowest ranked.
Lastly, Russia’s participation in international tournaments is still surrounded by political
controversy. Soon after Russia was selected as hosts, concerns over racism and LGBT rights
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caused some to call for nations to withdraw from the tournament.293 Calls for boycott increased
in 2014 when Russia annexed Crimea. United States senator Dan Coats compared Russia’s
World Cup to Nazi Germany hosting the 1936 Olympics.294 Finally, after political controversy,
scandal directly affected Russia’s athletic program. The International Olympic Committee
discovered that numerous Russian athletes had taken illegal performance enhancing drugs. The
IOC immediately stripped those athletes of their medals, but later investigation discovered that
the doping was condoned by the state. As a result, the Russian Olympic committee was officially
banned at the 2018 Pyongchang Winter Olympics.295 Naturally, soccer journalists and fans were
concerned if state-sponsored doping extended to the soccer team. Russian sports minister Vitaly
Mutko has repeatedly denied the allegations, but the illegal drug use has only increased calls for
boycott.
For better or worse, the 2018 World Cup will be a defining moment in Russian soccer
history. Amid the controversy surrounding the tournament, former FIFA president Sepp Blatter
continually supported Russia and hopes the World Cup will be a “force for good.”296 Success on
the soccer field seems unlikely for Russia; the squad could likely advance out of their group, but
anything more would be an overachievement. The real opportunity for success for Russia lies off
the field. A tournament without scandal, whether from fans, players, or protesters, would
improve foreign perception of Russia. Hopefully, the World Cup will be a defining moment that
improves the quality of Russian soccer as well as Russia’s relationship with the rest of the world.
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